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Abstract
This paper compares the career effects of overseas and domestic PhD
training for scientists working in an emerging economy, South Africa. Vari-
ations in scientific achievements of South African academics may arise be-
cause those who attend “better” PhD programmes receive better training,
but it may also be because good students select into good universities. We
examine selection and training effects for four tiers of South African and two
tiers of foreign universities. Those who received PhDs from universities in
industrialized countries tend to be more productive than those whose PhDs
were locally granted, but universities from industrialized countries do not
necessarily provide better training than local universities. Pure selection ef-
fects contribute to career outcomes nearly as much as training effects. When
looking at training in isolation, PhDs from top South African universities
produce a similar quantity and quality research output to those from leading
universities in the developed world.1
JEL codes: F63; H52; I2; O15; O20; O30
keywords: Scientific mobility; Doctoral studies; University evaluation; Develop-
ing country; South Africa; Technological upgrading
1Financial support for the project was provided by the Institut Universitaire de France, and
by the Chair in Economic Policy, ECON, KIT, Germany.
This paper is also circulating in the working paper series of BETA (http://www.beta-
umr7522.fr/productions/workingpapers.php) and MERIT (http://www.merit.unu.edu/
publications/working-papers/).
1 Introduction
The importance of universities in technological and economic development has long
been recognised (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1999; Murmann, 2003; Rosenberg and
Nelson, 1994) and in the context of increasingly knowledge-intensive economies,
it is likely that universities will play an even greater role in the future upgrading
of less developed countries. The importance of both foreign and indigenous uni-
versities in providing scientific training has been suggested on theoretical grounds
(Nelson, 2005), but the field has thus far failed to ask whether there is a difference
in the quality of PhD training provided locally versus abroad. This paper looks
at the scientific achievements of South African academics and explores how the
academic performance of scholars who have received PhD training in their home
country compares to that of scholars who were trained in the developed world.
This question matters both practically — developing countries invest substan-
tial resources to send their top students to presumed superior universities abroad
— and theoretically. Probably because of the complex and multifaceted role played
by universities, scholars have struggled to isolate the specific mechanisms by which
universities contribute to society. To advance scholarship on the question of how
universities support upgrading, a narrow focus may at this stage be useful. Much
as linkages and supporting institutions are essential to allow the wider society
to benefit from the work done at universities (Brundenius, Lundvall and Sutz,
2011), the quality of scientific training received at a university is foundational to
what the university can contribute to its society. This paper helps to clarify at
which universities scholars from developing countries are likely to receive the best
training.
The scholarly achievement of academics following their PhDs may occur be-
cause they selected (and were selected by) good universities, or because of the
training they had received at that university. Our econometric model allows for
both selection and training effects, and we examine them for four tiers of South
African and two tiers of foreign universities. We rely on the database of rated
academic researchers of the National Research Foundation of South Africa. This
database provides evidence of, inter alia, the quality level of scholars (as established
through an intensive process of peer review), their research productivity and where
they received their training. As can perhaps be expected given the perceptions of
local versus foreign universities, the overall effect of a foreign PhD is more positive
than that of a local PhD. But a decomposition into selection and training effects,
shows that selection contributes to career outcomes nearly as much as training.
Interestingly, our results show that universities from the industrialized countries
do not necessarily provide better training than local universities. When looking at
training in isolation from selection, scholars with PhDs from the best South African
universities produce a similar quantity and quality research output to those who
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had received their training from universities in the developed world.
Our findings suggest that it is perhaps too crude to differentiate along national
lines between universities. The leading universities globally attract the best South
African students, as they do for students across the world. But apart from that se-
lect group of universities, there are fewer differences between the research-intensive
universities in developing countries and their counterparts in the developed world
than have hitherto been acknowledged. A tiered differentiation between universi-
ties may be more useful in discussing the role of different universities.
2 Literature review
The important role of universities in technological and economic development has
long been recognised (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1999; Murmann, 2003; Rosenberg
and Nelson, 1994). Moreover, work on the growing importance of (scientific)
knowledge to economic growth suggests that the role of universities will continue
to increase in importance (Conceição and Heitor, 1999; Deiaco, Hughes and McK-
elvey, 2012). It follows that universities in middle-income countries are likely to
play an especially important role in technology and knowledge upgrading (Altbach,
2013; Brundenius, Lundvall and Sutz, 2011).
The direct economic impact of universities is obviously of interest to schol-
ars of economic development. Some form of direct economic benefit has long
been an outcome (or desired outcome) of the university, with university spin-offs
(Link and Scott, 2005), university-industry linkages (D’Este and Patel, 2007) and
the ‘entrepreneurial university’ (Etzkowitz, 2003) all receiving scholarly attention.
However, the economic impact of universities in industrialized versus developing
countries cannot be directly compared. Much as there is a strong relationship
between Silicon Valley and Stanford University, the economy of Bombay cannot
be ascribed to the quality (or not) of the Indian Institute of Technology Bombay.
The extent to which such benefits accrue is likely to be a reflection not only of the
quality of the university, but also of a range of institutional and historical factors
(Chen and Kenney, 2007).
The question of how universities in developing countries contribute to economic
and technological upgrading is further complicated by the fact that universities
play such a multifaceted role in society. In addition to their direct economic role,
they contribute to a basic stock of knowledge, to a capacity for problem-solving
and to skilled people (Salter and Martin, 2001). Universities are actors in nation-
building and increasingly also in the building of cross-national connections (Scott,
2006). And while it is possible to learn from the rich historical evidence about
the role of universities in the now-developed countries, such learning must be done
with an awareness that globalization has changed both universities and how up-
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grading takes place. Thus Altbach (2004) cautions that globalization may lead to
a form of academic ‘neo-colonialism’ where the institutions of developing countries
model themselves in potentially inappropriate ways on the leading universities,
while Mazzoleni and Nelson (2007) argue that globalization has resulted in an
increased global connectedness of scientific communities for those with the ‘appro-
priate training and connections’ to get into the relevant networks. One effect of
appropriate training and connections, presumably, is a more productive academic
career. This raises the question of the definition of “appropriate” (which presum-
ably contains reference to quality) and how training and connection-making are
best carried out to further both individual careers and university contribution to
development.
Moreover, apart from a few exceptions, e.g. Mathews and Hu (2007) and
Mazzoleni and Nelson (2007), there is little empirical work on how universities
in industrializing countries have been contributing to upgrading. The quite com-
mon practice of governments in underdeveloped countries (e.g. Delicado, 2010 re
Portugal; Güngör and Tansel, 2008 re Turkey and Song, 1997 re South Korea) to
support the study of students abroad suggests that indigenous universities may
not be capable of training beyond a certain level. However, there are also concerns
about the practice. For example, there are concerns about costs — should funds
not rather be used to build local capacity? Also, the brain drain debate considers
whether the potential higher human capital acquisition from a foreign PhD out-
weighs the potential loss of talent from those who choose to stay in the typically
better resourced and better networked universities of the industrialised world.
One of the difficulties in advancing this debate has been that it is so hard to
compare indigenous with foreign universities fairly. While recognizing the multi-
faceted nature of universities, we believe that there is benefit to a narrower focus.
In this paper, we therefore focus on arguably the core function of the univer-
sity, and certainly the one that differentiates the leading universities from others,
namely the ability to create new knowledge. In comparing indigenous with foreign
universities, two dimensions seem especially salient. The first is human capital
development. Investment in human capital has long been recognized as a key
enabler of development (Becker, 1962). Human capital development of course en-
compasses multiple activities, but given our desire to focus our study, we focus on
the extent to which a university trains scholars who do cutting-edge research. A
second important consideration relates to social capital. Not only is social cap-
ital instrumental in the development of human capital (Coleman, 1988), but in
an era of globalization and the increased global connectedness of science networks
(Mazzoleni and Nelson, 2007), universities are potentially important sites for the
development of cross-national scholarly networks.
The point about networks and linkages is embedded in much of the historical
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work on upgrading. One of the central themes emerging from historical research on
upgrading is the importance of cross-border contact and learning between people.
Indeed, that point has been made far more commonly about other forms of connec-
tion than about universities. A concern with how cross-national connections take
place has occupied scholars focusing on the nation as their unit of analysis (e.g.
Lall, 2001; Ozawa, 1992), the firm (e.g. Athreye and Cantwell, 2007; Narula and
Dunning, 2000; 2010) and the individual (e.g. Almeida, Phene and Li, 2014; Sax-
enian and Hsu, 2001). Learning and thus upgrading has long been recognized as
resulting from the contact between more and less skilled people, or representatives
from stronger and weaker institutions.
The issue of linkages and the connectedness of scholars not only to local ‘users’
like industry and policy makers, but importantly also to global scientific networks
(Bernardes and Albuquerque, 2003; Mathews and Hu, 2007; Olds, 2007) is also
a key theme in scholarship about the role of universities in the development of
lower and middle income countries. Universities are seen as playing a significant
role in facilitating cross-border learning. However, the universities of developing
countries are often presumed to play a role primarily in the development of skilled
personnel, while new knowledge is seen as being developed at foreign universi-
ties and transmitted to the less developed country through foreign-trained faculty
members. The statement by Nelson (2005:27) exemplifies such a view:
“Indigenous universities will play a key role as the source of students who take ad-
vanced training abroad, and as the home of faculty who have been trained abroad.”
Implicit in a statement like this is the belief that indigenous universities them-
selves are not capable of offering training beyond a certain level, or of developing
new knowledge. Even faculty who have received training from leading universities
globally are seen as teachers rather than creators of new knowledge once they re-
turn home. Given the scarcity of resources in developing countries, the need to
pay faculty enough to at least live a middle class lifestyle (Altbach, 2013) and the
high cost of developing and maintaining facilities like laboratories, this may well
be the situation in developing countries.
This view of the respective roles of universities in different parts of the world
is certainly is likely to have an effect on the process by which students from de-
veloping countries select the universities from which they wish to receive doctoral
training. It is likely that many potential students will see training in a foreign
university as desirable, and will actively explore options to study abroad. Given
the limited resources in developing countries, government-sponsored programmes
for PhD study abroad are typically very competitive, and only the top students
are selected. The prestige of obtaining such funding may well reinforce the view
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that training at a local university is a less desirable choice. Even when students do
not obtain government funding, it is almost the norm for foreign universities in the
industrialized world to offer financial support to doctoral students, and such sup-
port is another avenue through which strong students from developing countries
can receive doctoral training abroad.
But in addition to selection effects, the training that can be obtained at a
given university also needs to be considered. One important dimension of such
training is what Nelson and Sampat (2001) term ‘social technologies’. They give
the example of gaining mastery of the research methods of organic chemistry, and
describe the social technology as ‘the system of training young chemists in the
relevant physical technology’ (2001:50). They argue that ‘social technologies’, i.e.
the customs and codes of practice in a field, are an essential complement to physical
technologies and enable institutions to be effective. Nelson (2005) also argues that
in less developed countries, universities are important mechanisms for the diffusion
of such social technologies.
Under this view of the respective roles of universities in different parts of the
world, universities in developing countries will vary in the effectiveness with which
they use and disseminate such technologies. Indeed, a key dimension of our analysis
is the conviction that different universities may operate at different tiers, (and we
use the data to uncover these patterns). In the US, a highly stratified university
system helps the higher education system to respond to rapid societal changes
without compromising excellence (Conceicao and Heitor, 1999). In the case of
fast-growing and under-resourced developing countries where there is a great need
for skills development of the kind argued by Nelson (2005), a stratified system
will allow the university system to play a similarly differentiated role. Research
intensity may be the result of a deliberate government strategy, e.g. the role that
the University of Sao Paolo is intended to play in Brazil, or of historical factors,
e.g. the post-war role played by METU in Turkey that triggered a series of path-
dependencies.
It is equally important to recognize that universities have historically devel-
oped instruments to address the challenges that inevitably emerge in the course of
doing research (Rosenberg, 1992). Universities in developing countries may have
to adapt not only physical but also social technologies to better address the specific
challenges of their context. Certainly in the social sciences one of the challenges
has to do with the multi-lingual nature of many developing societies. Supervisors
in developing country universities are developing various strategies to supervise
the work of students who are gathering data in a language the supervisor (and
sometimes the student) may not know.
A similar point can be made not about the methods of doing research, but
about its content. It has been repeatedly stated that universities in developing
5
countries need to respond to local challenges to support upgrading (Brundenius,
Lundvall and Sutz, 2011; Mazzoleni and Nelson, 2007; Nelson, 2004). The types of
local challenges that are frequently mentioned (e.g. Lee, 2000; Mazzoleni and Nel-
son, 2007) are agriculture, medicine, and industry. Local conditions in aspects such
as income, weather, demography, and epidemiology (Bernardes and Albuquerque,
2003:870) require the development of new technologies to improve on often inade-
quate solutions that have tended to originate from high income countries. There
is general consensus that the best placed universities to develop such solutions are
typically the leading universities of the developing world. However, research into
the specific agricultural, medical or economic problems of a given underdeveloped
region has long been seen as a purely local response to a local challenge by scholars
and businesses from the industrialized world. Thus the problem, analysis of it, and
solution have all been geographically localized in the developing world.
This situation is slowly changing. For example GE’s India-based healthcare
unit earned substantial returns on healthcare innovations that were developed to
address some of the challenging conditions in India. These returns were earned
not only in developing country markets, but also in industrialized economies. As
evidence of the wider benefit of something like ‘frugal innovation’ (Zeschky, Widen-
mayer and Gassmann, 2011) increases, the wider scientific community is showing
a greater interest in what was previously seen as the local challenges of develop-
ing countries. Application of solutions to local problems (of developing countries)
are starting to be seen globally, implying integration at one end of the innovation
process. Integration further upstream may also be valuable.
Scholarship advances in the tension between novelty and convention. Scholars
need to demonstrate familiarity with the key works in the field, both their findings
and their scholarly conventions, but must also advance beyond those contributions.
The conventions guiding most fields are still shaped mainly in the developed world
(Corbett, Cornelissen, Delios and Harley, 2014). But to the extent that scholars
in developing countries are able to demonstrate an understanding and mastery
of the current (global) customs and codes of practice of scholarship, i.e. social
technologies, they are — arguably because rather than in spite of the challenges in
their specific locations — well placed to contribute novel knowledge to their fields.
This raises the question whether training locally or abroad will have greater impact
on a scientists career. Certainly integrating international norms and standards
will be crucial, but if that can be done within the local context, it may be that
being embedded in the local knowledge context may provide advantages in terms
of academic performance, at least in some fields. Local training may provide as
many benefits as international training.
In the coming sections we develop an econometric model which dis-entangles
selection and training effects at the PhD level. While a PhD from a top inter-
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national university is presumed to do more for one’s career, it is important to
to understand the extent to which (if it is indeed true) this comes from superior
training or merely selection and signalling. If training at good local universities
is “as good as” training at foreign universities, the added expense of sending stu-
dents to foreign PhD programmes may be a bad investment. With these issues in
mind, we do not presume any ordering of the quality of training or the rigours of
selection at universities of different status, and in particular we do not assume a
priori that domestic universities of middle income countries are inferior to those
of industrialized countries. Part of the issue is the role indigenous universities can
play in upgrading. The effectiveness of a PhD from an indigenous university will




The simple estimation of the effect of the quality of the PhD-granting university
on a person’s career is confounded by a selection effect. Something like “innate
ability” will affect both which university selects a person, and that person’s future
career regardless of where the PhD was granted. To address this identification
issue we use a structural equation model. The model includes an equation for
individual ability in combination with a factor structure model, where ability is
factored into both a selection and outcome equation.2
Our data are described in detail in Section 4, but to ease exposition we de-
scribe them briefly here. The data are generated by the rating system of the
South African National Research Foundation (NRF). Roughly every four years,
any researcher in South Africa wishing to apply for funds from the NRF, must
apply to be “rated”. This involves submitting a full CV, which is then refereed
by half a dozen international experts. On the basis of their referee reports, the
expert committee of the NRF assigns the researcher a rating (A, B, or C, grosso
modo). In the analysis that follows, we use this rating as a measure of the quality
of a researcher’s scientific output, and take advantage of the detailed biographical
information in the researcher’s application to control for other confounding factors.
In the context of our data, we assume that the “quality” rating given by the
NRF to a scientist depends on the individual’s ability, νi, and a training effect
2See e.g. Song and Lee (2012) for measurement equations in structural equation models in
combination with Aakvik et al. (2005) for factor structure models in treatment effect evalua-
tion. Heckman et al. (2014) investigate a Bayesian approach very similar to ours for treatment
evaluation.
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which is specifc to the university at which the PhD was attained. Universities select
doctoral students based on individual ability (νi), but universities are differently
aggressive in their selection: perhaps the top universities are very tough, only
taking students of the very highest ability; lesser-ranked universities cannot afford
to be so selective as they need to fill their classrooms. This effect is captured by the
parameter ζp. Generally, one would expect that institutions with a high training
effect, (βp), are able to implement higher selection pressure, (ζp), and attract more
able students, (νi). The model allows for such positive correlation.
3
Outline of the model The model is comprised of three equations which we
estimate as a system. The basic structure contains equations for three variables:
individual ability; PhD institution selection; and rating. Individual ability is la-
tent through being unobserved. Selection and rating are modelled as outcomes
of standard discrete-choice models, i.e. a multinomial and ordered logit respec-
tively. The time ordering from ability (before PhD) to PhD institution selection
and finally to subsequent ratings naturally results in a triangular system of three
equations. We discuss each of the three equations below.
Initial ability — linear model Our concern is with the career effects of PhD
study, or the added value of doing a PhD in particular types of universities. Thus
for our purposes, “innate ability” is less interesting than an individual’s “ability”
level just before starting the PhD. Thus our ability equation (which is more a
measurement equation than a modelling equation) contains the (type of) university
granting the Master degree, and whether the student was awarded a distinction
for that degree. We assume a linear model with normally distributed error term.
νi = V iγ + εi, (1)
where V i includes our two indicators of ability (Master’s institution and distinction
in the Master degree), and age at Master degree.
Thus the model considers master studies separately from subsequent PhD stud-
ies. This is in accordance with the South African higher education system. In
South Africa, differently from the US education system for example, holding a
master degree or equivalent postgraduate qualification is a prerequisite for being
admitted as a PhD student (Department of Education, 1998, Du Toit, 2012). Nev-
ertheless a problem may arise in practice when the Master degree is seen as the
3We assume that selection, training, and individual effects are all stable over time. Since it
might well be the case that the comparative advantage of South African universities has improved
against foreign universities over time, allowing for a trend in the selection and training effects
would be desirable. Unfortunately, the data do not provide sufficient information to estimate a
reliable time trend.
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first step in the PhD process, and so the Master and PhD are considered two
parts of one educational programme. When this is the case selection takes place
before rather than after the Master degree. We investigate how that may affect
our estimations in the sensitivity analysis by restricting attention to individuals
who have Master and PhD degrees from different institutions.
PhD university selection equation — multinomial logit We partition our
PhD granting universities into P groups, described below. Thus an individual
receives a PhD from one of the P university types. The selection process assigns
a student to one of the types of universities. Selection is two-sided, in the sense
that while it is based on individual ability, different types of universities will be
differently selective on that variable. (We might assume that the top universities
select only highest ability students, lower-ranked unversities are more catholic.)
We treat selection using a multinomial logit model — any individual i has a prob-
ability of being selected into each of the P university types. Thus the dependent
variable is a latent choice vector D∗i with P elements. Each element D
∗
i,p can be
interpreted as the fit between individual i and a university of type p, based on
ability and other controls:
D∗i,p = Ziαp + ζp νi + εi,p, (2)
where Zi is a (L)-vector of observed factors which vary over individuals, the cor-
responding coefficients αp vary over institutions. εi,p is an iid extreme value dis-
tributed error term. The usual relation between latent and observed choice vectors
applies. The selection effect is modelled through the factor ζp. What D
∗
i,p captures
is the jointly determined desirability of agent i attending university (of type) p. If
we consider Ziαp + ζp νi (dropping ε for the moment) we can think of this as the
term defining the probability that an agent with ability νi attends a university of
type p. Thus, selection probability is jointly determined by the attractiveness of
universities of type p to agent i, and the attractiveness of agents with ability νi
to universities of type p. When ε is realized, agent i attends the university having
the largest entry in the vector D∗i .
The vectors D∗i are not inherently interesting. Rather they are a means of
extracting ζp and νi, which are otherwise unobserved.
Rating equation — ordered logit The rating is modelled as an ordered probit
with a latent rating R∗i,t (which takes a real value). The rating, R
∗
i,t, of individ-
ual i at time t is modelled as a function of the individual’s ability νi, observed
factors X i,t, and an unobserved error term εi,t, assumed to be iid extreme value
distributed.
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R∗i,t = X i,tβp + νi + εi,t. (3)
Differences in training across universities are modelled by letting coefficients βp
on observed factors (including the intercept) vary freely with the university p where
the PhD was granted. εi,t is an iid extreme value distributed error term which
results in an ordered logit model.The latent rating results in observed rating Ri,t
depending on which thresholds (c) the latent outcome has crossed. Simultaneously
with the estimation of Equation 3 is the estimation of the vector of thresholds c
which translate from the latent, real-valued, rating to the observed, discrete-valued
actual rating granted by the National Research Foundation.
Table 1 summarises notation and indexing of model variables. Table 2 shows
the interdependence of the variables across the three equations. The first column
lists all endogenous and exogenous variables used in the model. The subsequent
three columns correspond to the three equations which model the endogenous
variables, i.e. Ability, PhD university category, and Rating respectively. Whenever
a variable enters an equation the table entry is marked with a cross. Here we can
see the system as a whole. We note that endogenous variables form a triangular
system, and each equation includes at least one exogenous factor which is excluded
from all other equations. Identification rests on both the triangular form and
exclusion restrictions.
3.2 Identification and estimation
All three individual equations model latent outcomes, two of them with discrete
observed outcomes. Therefore we impose some scale and level restriction in each
equation; by fixing the standard deviation of the error terms and introducing
a reference category in the choice settings respectively. The overall system of
equations is then identified through the exclusion of factor(s) from one equation
to subsequent equations within a triangular equation system.4 For example we
assume that the master degree university enters rating only through the (signal
of) initial ability and not directly. Furthermore, the selection equation includes
factors which do not enter the rating equation. We discuss these more in detail
below in the variable description, and assess their empirical importance in the
robustness section.
Measurement equation of initial ability All three equations are connected
through the unobserved ability, ν.
4Only relying on structural form and error term distribution assumptions does not allow for
reliable identification in practice.
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Table 1: Model variables overview
Indexing:
i = 1, . . . , N Individuals in the sample
t = 1, . . . , Ti Rating calls of individual i
p = 1, . . . , P PhD university categories
Observed variables:
Ri,t Rating of individual i at application t (ordered from C3 to A1)
Di University (p) where PhD obtained (unordered)
Vi Factors related to innate ability
Zi Factors affecting PhD university choice
Xi,t Factors affecting rating outcomes
Latent variables:
R∗i,t Latent rating outcome
D∗i Latent PhD university indicator vector of length P
νi Unobserved individual ability
Parameters:
γ Ability equation
α1, αp Selection equation
ζp PhD selection effect of university category p
βp Training effect of university category p
c Hurdles in rating equation
The expected unobserved ability is anchored at zero for students obtaining their
master from a ‘typical’ SA university (our university reference category), being of
average age, and obtaining no master distinction. Ability is then freely estimated
for master students deviating from this reference case. Thus, we do not model
unobserved ability in absolute terms but relative to the ability of a reference master
student. The error term is standard normal distributed. This way the variance of
the combination of error and ability term is fixed in subsequent equations.
Selection equation Constraints implied by the multinomial logit model are
standard (see Train, 2009). Since by definition the alternative with the highest
‘utility’ is chosen, only the ranking of alternatives can be modelled. Most factors
which enter the PhD university decision describe the individual, and hence do not
vary over alternatives within a decision. Differences in ‘utility’ are thus created
through alternative-varying coefficients. Ranking of alternatives is then with re-
spect to a base category whose ‘utility’ is set to zero. Our base category are South
African technicons and universities. Furthermore, we fix the scale by using the
11
Table 2: Variables by model equation
Variables Equation (1) Equation (2). Equation (3)
Ability (ν) PhD univ. cat. (D) Rating (R)
measurement eq. selection eq. outcome eq.
Endogenous
Ability (ν) - x x
PhD univ. cat (D) - - x
Rating (R) - - -
Exogenous V Z X
Age at master x - -
Master distinction x - -
Master univ. cat. x x -
PhD period - x -
Race - x x
Gender - x x
Scientific domain - x x
Experience - - x
standard logit formulation with an iid standard extreme value distributed error.
Rating equation Because we let the PhD training effect, βp, vary freely for
each university category, the level of latent rating outcomes is free. Translating
from the latent, real-valued, rating to the observed, categorical, rating involves
setting thresholds for the latent variable. Thresholds are set endogenously, and
for identification we set the first threshold to zero. Thus a latent rating below
zero becomes a ‘Rating Unsuccessful’. Latent ratings that are positive but close
to zero, become a ‘C3’. All the remaining 7 thresholds are then estimated freely.
Estimation The structural model constituted by equations 3, 2 and 1 is formu-
lated in classical terms, and given above assumptions, is identified under classical
conditions. We estimate the model however within a Bayesian framework, using
the Markov Chain Monte Carlo process and the No U-turn sampler.5 This ap-
proach is due to computational efficiency and has been already followed in prior
econometric work such as Hansen et al. (2004) for example. The Bayesian frame-
work however necessitates to fix some prior distributions of our parameters and
unobserved factors. We use flat, uninformative priors.6
5The results are not sensitive to the sampler used.
6These are the default prior distributions implemented in RStan, and in fact worked best of
all those that we examined.
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Proper convergence of the MCMC estimation is ensured by following the sug-
gestions of Gelman and Rubin (1992). In particular we run multiple Markov
Chains starting from different initial values and verify that the chains do not di-
verge but instead describe the same distribution (are ‘well mixing’). Furthermore
we make sure that the potential scale reduction is estimated to be close to one for
all scalar estimates. Finally, estimation results of the complete model are found
to be reasonably close to single equation estimations.
4 Data
4.1 Sample
We compare foreign-trained with the locally-trained PhDs active in the South
African academic community, and use the rated researchers of its National Re-
search Foundation (NRF) as our sample. The NRF (www.nrf.ac.za) is a state
agency that has as its mission the promotion of research and the development of
national research capacity. One of its key roles is to facilitate the ‘rating’ of re-
searchers at universities and other public research institutions such as museums.
The rating process is similar to the tenure process at North American universi-
ties, but it is focused only on research (not teaching or service to the institution),
centrally administered (not by the institution) and valid only for a set period (the
exact period has changed over the years, but is around five years).
NRF ratings are useful to understand the quality of research in the academic
community in South Africa since essentially all active researchers in the South
African academic research community are NRF-rated, partly because this renders
researchers eligible for NRF grant funding, and partly because ratings are used
by institutions, for example to benchmark relative to other institutions or as the
basis for promotion decisions.
As part of the rating process, researchers provide the NRF with evidence of
research outputs. A specialist review panel selects six (local and foreign) reviewers
who are asked to read at least the self-identified most significant papers of the
candidate. Each reviewer assesses the research outputs, and both an independent
assessor and the specialist review committee consider the referee reports to assign
a rating.
NRF ratings are a useful indicator of the quality of researchers in the academic
community in South Africa because of the rigour of the review process, the fact
that the NRF filings are detailed (including not only extensive personal detail but
also information about outputs as diverse as peer-reviewed journal articles, books,
conference presentations, patents, policy or technical reports, and publications
in the public press) and suffer very little missing information. As part of the
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application process, researchers provide the NRF with demographic information,
including the institution where they have obtained their degrees.
Our sample is based on the complete, digital files of the NRF spanning the
years 2002 to 2012. The NRF maintains two rating systems.7 We include only
scientists who obtained PhDs after 1970 because the data suggests that we have
a regime shift concerning the decision to go abroad around that year. The third
restriction is that only students whose first academic degree observed in the data,
i.e. Bachelor or Master, and last master prior to PhD has been obtained in South
Africa.This way we ensure that we only consider students with South African
education up to the master making the decision to go or not to go abroad. Finally
we remove all individuals with missing information from the sample.
The main sample used to obtain the main results is restricted to 1. senior
researchers, 2. PhD after 1970, 3. researchers who did their studies until master
at a South African institution. In total these are 1189 scientists experiencing 2432
rating events.8
4.2 Variables
Our main focus is how being a PhD graduate of a certain university relates to a
scientist’s subsequent scientific performance.
Ideally, we would like to investigate this relationship for each university indi-
vidually, but in practice we are forced to create groups of universities in order to
combine a sufficient number of observations for the econometric analysis. In total
we construct six PhD university categories: three SA university categories and two
foreign university categories. We constructed categories before estimation based
on the Shanghai ranking (AWRU). In particular for SA universities, this ranking
is consistent with other prominent university rankings such as the Times Higher
Education ranking. Resulting categories are summarised in Table 3.
SA research universities form the three university categories which are denoted
first-tier, second-tier, and third-tier SA university. A fourth category includes all
remaining SA universities and technikons. Foreign universities provide a bench-
mark for the SA university categories. In order to position SA universities within
7There are three common ratings: A, B and C; and three “special” ratings: L, Y and P. The
latter group is dedicated to junior researchers, the former to senior researchers. Although there
is no strict rule, most researchers shift from junior to senior status within five to ten years of
obtaining their PhD. Our analysis focusses on senior researchers for simplicity and because we
are mostly interested in the long-term effects of PhD training.
8The sensitivity section provides further estimation results on variations of the sample.
92011
10Dropped out of the AWRU in 2008, though it appears in earlier years.
114 British, 1 Canadian, 2 Japanese, 1 Swiss, 22 US universities
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Table 3: University categories
University category University Shanghai ranking9
First tier SA university University of Cape Town 201-300
Witwatersrand University 201-300
Second tier SA university University of Stellenbosch 401-500
University of KwaZulu-Natal 401-500
Third tier SA university University of Pretoria –10
Rhodes University –
University of Johannesburg –
SA university/technikon Remainder SA category
First tier foreign university 30 foreign universities11 1-30
Foreign university Remainder category
the distribution of foreign universities, we need at least two foreign university
categories. We limit ourselves to two categories, in order to keep the number of
‘destinations’ for PhD students in our model as small as possible. The group of
1st-tier foreign universities consists of all universities ranked among the top 30
universities in the 2011 Shanghai ranking. The rest enters the remainder group,
‘other’ foreign universities.12
Scientific performance is measured using the NRF ratings. The rating system
categorises researchers according to three broad categories, i.e. from C (established
researchers), over B (internationally acclaimed researcher), to A (leading interna-
tional researcher). Obtaining even a C-rating is considered a success, since ratings
may also be unsuccessful. We therefore consider an unsuccessful rating as a sepa-
rate, lowest category.
Figure 1 shows the percentage of ratings falling in each broader category, start-
ing from ‘Rating unsuccessful’ over ‘C’, ‘B’, up to ‘A’, for each university category
where PhD has been obtained. Across university categories, the majority of sci-
entists obtain a C-rating (60 to 70 percent), B-ratings are relatively common (10
to 30 percent), and A-ratings are rarely awarded (1 to 10 percent).
In general the chance of obtaining a higher rating increases with having a PhD
from a university of higher reputation. The ordering is strict for SA university
12Out of 1189 scientists in the sample 155 scientists obtained a foreign PhD. Nearly all students
with foreign PhD obtained their degree at a Shanghai ranked university (86%). Roughly one third
(45 students) at a university ranked among the best 30 institutions, one third ranked between
positions 30 and 100, and the remaining between 100 up to 500 (the last Shanghai rank). Main
results and statistics are based on including the top 30 universities of the Shanghai ranking into
the 1st-tier foreign university category; all of which having a very high international reputation
for both research and education. The Sensitivity section presents results from variations of the
definition of 1st-tier foreign university.
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Figure 1: Rating shares by PhD university category. Based on all rating observa-
tions. The four bars for each university type should sum to one.
categories. For example in Figure 1, a B-rating is obtained by about 10 percent of
the graduates from ‘other’ SA universities, 20 percent of third-tier SA university
graduates, 25 percent of second-tier university graduates and 30 percent of first-
tier university graduates. As expected, graduates from top-tier foreign institutions
outperform all others.
The econometric model is estimated on fine rating categories as outcomes of
the performance equation, Eq. 3. The fine ratings further distinguish within C,
B, and A categories by excellence and internationality to arrive at the following
categories: Rating Unsuccessful, C3, C2, C1, B3, B2, B1, A2, and A1. In the
Appendix, Table 11 provides the relation between PhD university category and
rating on this more detailed level. Finer ratings follow the same pattern as the
broader ratings.
If the rating of established scientists would coincide with the quality of their
PhD training, the analysis could stop here. However, the ordering of scientific
achievements by PhD university category may result not only from training effects,
i.e. differences in the quality of PhD training, but also from selection effects, i.e.
heterogeneity of students’ scientific ability before their PhD training.
There is some support for the selection effect explanation. For example, first-
tier foreign universities attract in particular young students who obtained their
16
master degree with distinction.13 It is also the case that researchers with distinc-
tion at the master level tend to have higher NRF ratings, suggesting that ability
matters both for PhD location and for future ratings.
Whereas age and distinction at master might well serve as signals of scientific
ability on the basis of which a (foreign) university can select it’s PhD students, it
seems unlikely that these characteristics exert a strong influence on an international
expert committee which judges scientific excellence of an established researcher
twenty years later. Consequently, we allow age at master and master distinction
to be indicators of ability in the measurement equation. Age at master is the age
when the first master degree was obtained. For easier interpretation this variable
is transformed in the estimation such that we count years in decades from age
twenty. The youngest master graduate being twenty one hence obtains a value of
0.1. We might expect the coefficient to be negative since, all else equal, we expect
more able people to obtain their degrees earlier.
As a further signal of ability after master we indicate master distinction, i.e.
whether or not the master degree has been obtained with distinction; (roughly half
masters degrees in our sample were awarded distinction). Neither age at master
nor master distinction is assumed to influence directly subsequent selection or
performance equations.14
We also assume that students who obtain masters degrees from the same uni-
versity will have similar post-Master ability. As for the PhD it seems reasonable
that students’ human capital is clustered by universities due to both selection and
training effects. Master university categories are constructed exactly as the PhD
university categories. Master university category enters the PhD university
selection equation, capturing some of the differences in the benefit and costs of
13Overall, fifty percent of students obtained their master degree between 25 and 30 years
(interquartile range) with a median age of 27 years. PhD students at first-tier foreign universities
obtained their master between 24 and 26 years with a median age of 26 years. Furthermore, two
third of PhD students at first-tier foreign universities received a master degree with distinction,
compared to an average of about fifty percent in the sample. Differences in distinction do not
seem too large for other categories.
14Clearly, distinction in a master’s degree does enter the deliberations of a PhD admissions
committee, but we assume that it enters as a signal of innate ability and so should enter our
ability equation. Age might influence the student’s decision of PhD university category. Older
students are more likely to have a family for example and therefore less willing to leave the
country than younger students. The year when the PhD decision has been made is however
not available, and this decision is not necessarily made directly after master. The best available
proxy is the age when PhD degree has been obtained. Age at master is significantly correlated
with, age at PhD (with a correlation coefficient of about 0.5). Introducing that variable into
the PhD selection equation however is doubtful because the estimated coefficient of age at (end
of) PhD is particularly strong and significant for top-tier foreign universities but not for other
foreign universities. This signals that age at PhD is either a selection criterion or an outcome of
the PhD program. Therefore we do not introduce this variable.
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PhD university choices across master students.
Table 4 shows the transition from master university to PhD university category
for focal South African students. Each row in the table captures students from one
type of Master institution, a cell in a row indicates where students from that type
of Master institution did their PhDs. The transition pattern is relatively ordered:
master students from SA universities with higher reputation are more likely to go
abroad to foreign universities of high reputation. For example seven percent of
master students from an SA top-tier university did their PhD at a top-tier foreign
university (fourth row, sixth column), whereas only four percent (five percent) of
students obtaining their master from 2nd- (3rd-) tier SA universities dis so (sixth
column). Such a pattern provides a loading of the master university category
factor in the ability equation.
Table 4: Transition from master to PhD university category, frequency (row per-
centage).
PhD SA university PhD foreign university Total
Others 3rd-tier 2nd-tier 1st-tier Others 1st-tier
Others 314 (0.73) 49 (0.11) 23 (0.05) 11 (0.03) 30 (0.07) 6 (0.01) 433 (1)
3rd-tier 39 (0.15) 179 (0.68) 11 (0.04) 11 (0.04) 14 (0.05) 11 (0.04) 265 (1)
2nd-tier 26 (0.09) 17 (0.06) 178 (0.62) 18 (0.06) 36 (0.12) 14 (0.05) 289 (1)
1st-tier 5 (0.02) 15 (0.07) 19 (0.09) 119 (0.59) 30 (0.15) 14 (0.07) 202 (0.99)
Total 384 (0.32) 260 (0.22) 231 (0.19) 159 (0.13) 110 (0.09) 45 (0.04) 1189 (0.99)
A further pattern in Table 4 is that most master students stay at ‘their’ uni-
versity (category) for the PhD. There are several explanations. One relates again
to ability, in that there may be a match between the ability of a student obtaining
a master from a certain university with the requirements of that university regard-
ing the ability of their future PhDs. Further explanations have nothing to do with
scientific ability as such. Firstly, master studies orient the student to subjects
treated within the faculty and thereby create a thematic fit. Secondly, uncertainty
regarding both the doctoral program and the student may be reduced due to the
master experience. Finally, students may have established favourable social and
economic conditions during their master studies which increases their opportunity
costs of choosing another university. Therefore, ‘Master university category’ enters
also the PhD university selection equation, capturing some of the differences in
the benefit and costs of PhD university choices across master students.
South Africa suffered an “academic boycott” between the 1960s and 1990.
Precisely what its effects were is debated,15 but we do observe that the distribution
of where scientists received their PhDs does vary over time. There may be many
causal processes beneath this variation, among which the academic boycott, but
15See for example Sha, 1986.
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in general we might expect a temporal effect on the decision to go abroad (or the
propensity of foreign universities to select South African students). Unfortunately,
data limitations prevent us from estimating time trends of selection and training
effects. As a result, our estimations provide an intuition on the selection and
training effects that took place during the last forty years in average. Accordingly
the variable Period of PhD, dummies indicating the five year interval in which
the PhD has been obtained, enters the selection equation but is excluded from the
rating equation, satisfying the exclusion restriction to aid identification.
Experience captures the post PhD experience of the scientist at the time of
rating. We measure experience with a set of dummies indicating whether the rating
takes place five to nine, ten to fourteen, etc. years after PhD. We find Experience
to have a strong positive relationship with fine rating outcomes. Clearly, increasing
seniority allows for higher potential scientific achievements. Since time passes for
everybody, it is an exogenous variable.
Finally, Race, Gender, and Scientific Domain are three control variables
that enter the PhD university selection equation as well as the rating performance
equation.16
5 Main Result
Deatiled discussion of the model and coefficient estimates is presented in sections
5.2 and 5.3. Before turing to those details, though, we discuss how well the model
fits the observations. We compare predicted values and observed values for two
variables: where students did their PhD training; and, given where the PhD was
granted, their rating outcomes.
5.1 Model fit
Before we turn to estimates of specific coefficients, we assess how the model fits
the data more generally. Table 5 compares the fitted probability of selecting a
PhD university category with the observed choice. For example, of the students
who received their PhDs from “other SA” (type 1) universities, 63 percent were
predicted by the model to attend other SA; 14 percent were predicted to attend
third-tier SA, and so on. What is striking here is that the looking at any column,
which captures where the model predicts students will go, the heaviest entry is
on the diagonal — when the model predicts that a student goes to a university of
type x, this is in fact where we are most likely to see him.
In fact, the probability assigned by the model, of attending a particular PhD
university (type) is throughout highest for those which did in fact graduate from
16Out of the 1189 scientists, most are white (1026), male (800), in natural sciences (703).
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Table 5: Fitted probabilities of PhD university category, averaged over observed
PhD university. To be read as: of those observed to graduate from type 1, (other
SA), 63 % were predicted to graduate from type 1, 14 % from type 2, 9% from
type three etcetera.
Fitted Probability
Observed choice 1 2 3 4 5 6
Other SA (1) 0.63 0.14 0.09 0.04 0.07 0.03
3rd-tier SA (2) 0.21 0.50 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.04
2nd-tier SA (3) 0.15 0.12 0.50 0.08 0.10 0.04
1st-tier SA (4) 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.48 0.09 0.05
Other foreign (5) 0.24 0.16 0.24 0.17 0.14 0.05
1st-tier foreign (6) 0.15 0.22 0.23 0.20 0.12 0.07
that type. In particular for the SA PhD university categories, we find a high
probability mass of around 50 percent on the categories which in fact have been
observed (see values on the diagonal of Table 5). Fitted probabilities to attend a
foreign university category are highest for those that actually went abroad (seen
by reading down the last two columns.)
Table 6 compares for each group of PhD university category graduates the
actual and fitted average rating outcomes. Fitted shares follow the observed ones
relatively closely.17 χ2 tests are not able to reject the hypotheses that observed
and fitted ratings stem from the same distributions, except for rating outcomes of
‘other SA university’ PhDs.18
5.2 Regression results
Table 7 shows the coefficient estimates of the model. In addition, the first two
lines of Table 7 provide two further statistics derived from the estimates: average
ability and average training for each PhD university category — capturing the
selection and training effects in latent ratings outcomes.
17The (slight) over- and under-fitting in some cases can be traced back to the restrictions which
we impose on the distribution of the latent rating outcome (R∗). In particular, we model the
mean of latent rating outcomes and not the variance and skewness; be it directly through the
error term in the rating function or indirectly through the ability equation. We experimented
with expanding the model in that direction, but relaxing the distributional assumption comes at
the cost of weaker identification, lower estimation precision, and potential over-fitting which we
found to be too high.





, where the sum is over ratings
i, pi and p̂i denote observed and fitted probabilities respectively, and N denotes the number of
ratings observed for the respective PhD group. The degrees of freedom of the χ2 distribution is
three in all cases.
20
Table 6: Average rating outcome probability for PhD university categories with
χ2 statistics
R.U. C B A χ2 p-value
Other SA university (N= 898)
Observed 0.1653 0.6973 0.1160 0.0213
Fitted 0.1632 0.6910 0.1353 0.0105 10.6251 0.0139
3rd tier SA university (N= 652)
Observed 0.1220 0.6792 0.1914 0.0075
Fitted 0.1177 0.6775 0.1903 0.0145 1.8965 0.5942
2nd tier SA university (N= 580)
Observed 0.0944 0.6631 0.2253 0.0172
Fitted 0.0885 0.6660 0.2265 0.0189 0.2693 0.9657
1st tier SA university (N= 433)
Observed 0.0769 0.5929 0.2949 0.0353
Fitted 0.0652 0.6065 0.2935 0.0348 0.7583 0.8594
Other foreign university (N= 234)
Observed 0.0880 0.5480 0.3240 0.0400
Fitted 0.0792 0.5962 0.2881 0.0364 2.4237 0.4892
1st tier foreign university (N= 97)
Observed 0.0083 0.6198 0.2893 0.0826
Fitted 0.0288 0.5428 0.3613 0.0671 5.2727 0.1529
Average ability is the expected ability of PhD students in each university cat-
egory. Universities of higher reputation in general are found to attract more able
students. In South Africa, average ability is estimated to be lowest at ‘other SA
universities’ and highest at ‘1st-tier SA universities’. ‘Other foreign universities’
attract students of same quality as the best SA universities (average ability of 0.4
and 0.42, respectively). ‘1st-tier foreign universities’ host the most able students,
as they have an average ability which is significantly higher than that of any other
university. Overall, the estimates of ability over universities is relatively precise,
though not always significant.
Average training is calculated as the average over experience, our time- and
university-dependent intercept in the rating equation. We can observe that the
quality of the PhD granting university does have a direct effect on the rating a sci-
entist receives. What is striking, however is that there is not a complete dominance
21
by foreign over South African universities. While we observe that highest ratings
are indeed associated with the best (foreign) universities, we also observe that the
best-considered South African universities are better than a generic foreign univer-
sity (estimates of 3.99 and 3.79, respectively). Estimates of average training are
relatively close given their standard errors. Thus, while estimated average training
provides a reasonable order of universities, there may be considerable variation at



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































We turn now to the estimates of coefficients in the three equations of the model.
Section ‘ability equation’ in Table 7 shows that ability, at least as judged by PhD
admissions committees, is particularly high for young students who received a
distinction on their masters degree. These effects are fixed over university cate-
gories. Although coefficients are positive for 3rd and 2nd tier master universities,
as might be expected, they are not significantly different from zero due to the
relatively high standard errors. First tier SA universities issue (signals of) ability
significantly higher than all other SA university categories.
Section ‘Selection equation’ in Table 7 contains the regression results pertaining
to the PhD selection equation. The first column provides the variables, and each
subsequent column corresponds to one type of PhD university. Coefficients of
factors that vary only across individuals and not over alternatives are set to zero
for the baseline category ‘other SA university’.
In detail, inertia value contains four dummy variables which indicate whether
the PhD university category in question was the same as the student’s master
university category. The tendency of master students to stay at ‘their’ university
(type) for their PhD is reflected in the positive and significant coefficient estimates
for all four SA university categories. These coefficients can be seen as capturing
the value of inertia in PhD university choice.19
PhD period has some influence on the probability that a student is selected into
a particular class of PhD university, but changes from one period to the next are
not overly strong, when considering the standard deviation of coefficients. Female
students are less likely to enter 1st-tier foreign universities, and black students
obtained their degree relatively often from second tier SA universities or abroad.
Social science PhDs are less sought at third and first tier SA universities.
As expected, in general the aggression with which universities examine ability
at the end of the Master degree increases as we read the estimates for ζ from left
to right on the bottom row. Roughly speaking this accords with the intuition
that higher ranked universities will apply stricter standards for PhD admission.
The curiosity in this row is that 1st-tier SA universities obtain a coefficient that is
much smaller than those below them in status, insignificant and close to zero. This
however does not mean that 1st-tier SA universities fall short in talented master
students, as they simply recruit (perhaps “excessively”) their own master students.
Average ability, the first statistic presented in the table, in combination with
Inertia value, suggests that the strong tendency of first-tier SA master students to
stay for PhD offsets the selection factor ζ.20
The two subsequent parts of Table 7 pertain to the rating equation. The
19Recall that the sample includes only students who completed their Masters degrees in South
Africa, so there can be no inertia for foreign universities.
20In the sensitivity analysis below, restricting the sample to those who changed universities
between Master and Doctorate increases this coefficient to its “natural” place in the order.
24
coefficient estimates of the rating equation, β, represents the estimation of the
real-valued, latent R∗. The bottom panel gives the threshold values that convert
from R∗ to the letter rating given in the raw data.
To interpret the β coefficients it is necessary to make reference to the thresholds
c. For example: the coefficient of five to nine years of experience after PhD for
students from an ‘other SA university’ is 1.82. Ignoring individual ability, we
would expect a ‘C2’ rating (since C2 = 1.74 < 1.82 < 3.78 = C1). It takes an
expected 30 years of experience for that scientist to obtain a C1 rating. In contrast,
a scientist holding a PhD from a first tier SA university can be expected to obtain
a C1 within 15 years — half the time.
Taking into account individual ability, which adds to training effects at each rat-
ing event, further changes expectations: PhD graduates from ‘other SA university’
would never be expected to obtain a B3 rating (4.37 (35+ years of experience) −
0.34 (avg. ability) = 4.03 < 4.85 = B3), while PhDs from ‘1st-tier university’
would be expected to obtain a B3 rating or higher after 15 years of experience
(3.99 (15− 19 years of experience) + 0.88 (avg. ability) = 4.87 > 4.85 = B3).
Overall the pattern of experience effects seems coherent. Reading coefficients
down the columns, we find for any PhD university type that experience increases
the likelihood of getting a better rating. Reading the coefficients along the line,
we find that doing a PhD from universities of higher reputation is advantageous
for subsequent career achievements due to training (independent of ability). Dif-
ferences however are relatively small and uncertain overall. The overall pattern is
well characterised by the average training statistic in the second row of Table 7.
Finally, being female reduces one’s latent rating, as does being non-white. The
racial effect has in general a higher significance level than the gender effect, neither
being statistically significant at standard levels.
5.3 Training and selection effects
Speaking loosely, a scientist’s rating is affected by his or her innate ability and
his or her training. Where ability stops and training starts is in general an open
question. We have defined ability as measured at the end of a Master degree.
Training then refers to training received during the course of completing a PhD.
In this section we identify the magnitudes of those two effects separately.
The econometric model identifies treatment and selection effects through the
joint estimation of the parameters β and ζ respectively. Given the model and
data, we obtain the conditional probability of obtaining a certain rating for each
individual:
P (Ri,t = j|Xi,t, νi, βp),
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where X is the vector of controls, νi individual ability, and βp training effects of
the university of type p.
The probability is conditioned on both ability and training (among other
things), so taking one marginal distribution (conditional on either ability or train-
ing) will give us the distribution of one or the other effects. The expected value of
that marginal distribution will be the average size of the effect.21
Put another way, what we refer to as the training effect captures the follow-
ing thought experiment. Send a student randomly chosen from the population to
different universities to do a PhD. Different universities give different training. De-
pending on which university he or she goes to, we would make different predictions
regarding his or her rating. Table 8 shows these probabilities (estimations, with
confidence intervals beneath each estimate). Each column represents the probabil-
ity distribution of rating outcomes given that a randomly chosen student attends
a particular type of PhD institution. Thus each column in principle sums to one.
Students most likely to receive a “rating unsuccessful” (R.U.) are those who
receive their PhDs from a generic South African university/technikon or a third
tier SA institution. Least likely are those who go to a top university, be it in South
African or abroad.
Reading down any column reveals a non-monotonic pattern. In every column
the peak is at rating level C2. This is simply because in the data this is the most
common rating. Reading across reveals that the higher ratings (A and B) are
more likely to be achieved by those who went to Foreign top universities. However
again we see evidence that “foreign” does not in any simple sense dominate “South
African”. High ratings are more likely to be achieved by those whose PhDs are
from top South African universities than those receiving them from generic foreign
universities. Again university quality rather than location is what matters.
The sorting parameter ζ creates differences in expected ratings conditional on
PhD university ex ante, or net of, the treatment. As for the rating effect, the
selection effect corresponds to the expected value of the marginal distribution, but
21More formally, the training effect is defined here as






P (Ri,t = j|Xi,t, νi,βp).
We define a selection effect similar to the training effect, but this time we integrate out the
training effect. The selection effect enters through the fact that the distribution of unobserved
ability ν, Φ(νp), can be expected to vary across PhD universities.






P (Ri,t = j|Xi,t, νp,βs) ,
where νp is normally distributed with mean average ability at university p, and empirical standard
deviation of ability in the population. Training βs is from a randomly drawn university. Averages
are obtained in each simulation/estimation iteration within MCMC.
26
Table 8: Training effect estimates, 90 percent confidence interval in ()
PhD SA university PhD foreign university
Others 3rd-tier 2nd-tier 1st-tier Others 1st-tier
RU 0.128 0.131 0.091 0.086 0.105 0.086
(0.109, 0.148) (0.102, 0.159) (0.069, 0.116) (0.062, 0.107) (0.072, 0.136) (0.045, 0.134)
C3 0.216 0.206 0.176 0.159 0.179 0.16
(0.196, 0.237) (0.187, 0.223) (0.148, 0.204) (0.134, 0.183) (0.152, 0.207) (0.116, 0.195)
C2 0.331 0.318 0.326 0.309 0.309 0.301
(0.318, 0.346) (0.304, 0.333) (0.31, 0.342) (0.291, 0.328) (0.286, 0.328) (0.26, 0.329)
C1 0.135 0.135 0.155 0.158 0.147 0.153
(0.121, 0.148) (0.118, 0.151) (0.135, 0.174) (0.142, 0.179) (0.128, 0.164) (0.127, 0.173)
B3 0.072 0.075 0.089 0.096 0.087 0.094
(0.06, 0.084) (0.061, 0.086) (0.075, 0.105) (0.083, 0.112) (0.073, 0.105) (0.077, 0.118)
B2 0.067 0.072 0.088 0.099 0.09 0.101
(0.055, 0.079) (0.062, 0.086) (0.07, 0.108) (0.084, 0.116) (0.073, 0.111) (0.077, 0.131)
B1 0.037 0.043 0.052 0.063 0.057 0.069
(0.028, 0.047) (0.034, 0.052) (0.039, 0.068) (0.046, 0.084) (0.044, 0.071) (0.046, 0.095)
A 0.015 0.019 0.022 0.029 0.027 0.036
(0.01, 0.02) (0.012, 0.026) (0.016, 0.03) (0.019, 0.038) (0.018, 0.037) (0.021, 0.055)
this time we integrate out the training effect of PhD universities.
The question we answer here is: What would I achieve with having just any
kind of training but the brain of a Harvard/other foreign/first tier SA/. . . student?
Selection effects displayed in Table 9 follow the same pattern as training effects.
For example, “unsuccessful ratings” are, again, most likely for PhD students that
obtained their PhD from the base category ‘other’ SA universities. This time
however, as probabilities are based on ‘average training effects’, so the reason for
the pattern lies in the lower estimated ability of the students selected into those
universities. Overall, selection is estimated to introduce considerable heterogeneity
of scientific performance across PhD university categories.
First tier foreign universities attract the brightest students. For the lowest and
higher ratings (R.U. C3, B, A) this result is also statistically significant: the 90
percent confidence intervals of first-tier foreign university students so not overlap
with the intervals of the generic or third tier SA universities.
A further noticeable result is how the ranking of ‘other’ foreign university
changes for the selection effect compared to the training effects. While the train-
ing effects of other foreign university PhD students have been approximately on
the same level as for 2nd tier SA universities, selection effects of other foreign
university PhD students compare rather to the 1st tier SA universities. Thus,
although ‘other’ foreign universities offer a training which compares to that of a
2nd tier SA university, average foreign universities tend to attract students which
are of the same innate ability level as 1st tier SA university students.
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Table 9: Selection effect estimates, 90 percent confidence interval in ()
PhD SA university PhD foreign university
Others 3rd-tier 2nd-tier 1st-tier Others 1st-tier
RU 0.145 0.116 0.105 0.086 0.09 0.061
(0.113, 0.181) (0.092, 0.141) (0.084, 0.129) (0.063, 0.107) (0.072, 0.108) (0.045, 0.079)
C3 0.217 0.195 0.185 0.164 0.169 0.134
(0.194, 0.239) (0.172, 0.219) (0.162, 0.204) (0.14, 0.186) (0.148, 0.189) (0.113, 0.154)
C2 0.326 0.326 0.324 0.316 0.319 0.296
(0.311, 0.34) (0.311, 0.339) (0.309, 0.34) (0.299, 0.335) (0.3, 0.336) (0.275, 0.314)
C1 0.134 0.146 0.152 0.16 0.158 0.17
(0.117, 0.152) (0.127, 0.163) (0.137, 0.167) (0.142, 0.175) (0.142, 0.173) (0.153, 0.186)
B3 0.071 0.082 0.087 0.096 0.094 0.109
(0.059, 0.087) (0.068, 0.096) (0.073, 0.101) (0.082, 0.113) (0.082, 0.109) (0.095, 0.124)
B2 0.063 0.077 0.083 0.097 0.093 0.118
(0.051, 0.079) (0.062, 0.097) (0.068, 0.099) (0.078, 0.113) (0.079, 0.109) (0.097, 0.141)
B1 0.033 0.042 0.046 0.057 0.054 0.076
(0.024, 0.042) (0.031, 0.055) (0.035, 0.057) (0.046, 0.07) (0.041, 0.067) (0.059, 0.098)
A 0.012 0.016 0.018 0.024 0.022 0.035
(0.008, 0.016) (0.012, 0.021) (0.012, 0.027) (0.017, 0.031) (0.016, 0.031) (0.023, 0.049)
Finally, comparing tables 9 and 8 we observe very similar patterns. Examining
any row (B3 for example) in the two tables we observe that the magnitudes of
the coefficients are very similar. In addition, the pattern across the row, which
indicates the relative value of training or selection at a the different university
types, is also very similar in the two tables. The same is true if we compare two
columns in the two tables. What this suggests is that the effect of a foreign PhD
on rating arises from both selection and from training, and that the magnitudes
of the two effects are roughly equal: selection is as important as training.
6 Sensitivity Analysis
This section provides a short discussion on the validity of our results in light of
additional analyses. A more detailed discussion along with result tables of analyses
is provided in the Appendix of this working paper.
First, we conducted a Monte Carlo analysis to verify that the model, as
implemented, produces unbiased estimates given the true data generation process
(dgp) of simulated data corresponds to that assumed by the model. One particu-
lar restriction introduced into the model was to fix the scale of latent, individual
ability relative to the error term in the latent rating equation. While identification
in theory is possible without this restriction, it was needed in practice for identi-
fication and convergence. The Monte Carlo analysis shows that when the relative
influence in the true dgp differs from that assumed in estimation, a bias is created.
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When the relative importance of ability in fact is higher than assumed, treatment
effects will be over- and selection effects under-estimated.
Therefore, we estimated several alternative models. Estimating the same
model as in the main text with various scalings of ability in the rating equation,
we observe that the likelihood improves with increasing scales of ability. This
indicates considerable individual-level heterogeneity in research outcomes beyond
that captured by the restricted model. However, results get extreme in that there
is the tendency to attribute all achievements to individual (signals of) ability and
nothing to training. One reason the model is not able to separate ability from
training may be that the training effect of a university actually depends on the
students’ ability.
We therefore test an alternative model which allows for such an ability de-
pendent training effect: the idea is that the PhD training actually transforms the
students’ ability as signalled before the PhD, into scientific competence after PhD.
For each university, we model training as a projection of three levels of ex-ante
ability — low, medium, and high ability — onto scientific competence which in-
fluences subsequent ratings. Selection of ability remains as in the main model.
Since levels of competence are freely estimated, the relative scale of ability and
the error in the rating equation is no longer an issue. This advantage comes at
the cost of assuming a common shape of the career trajectory subsequent to PhD.
The training effect is then in the level of the trajectory given by the competence
acquired through training of ones (ex-ante) ability. Estimation results suggest
that ability and training are indeed interdependent. Yet, although this alternative
model differs considerably in spirit from our main model, they produce the same
pattern and magnitudes of training and selection effects. Therefore, we consider
the main model as estimated in the text as a useful simplification which is robust
to alternative frameworks.
Finally, we tried variations on the sample and coding of variables which we
estimated on the model in the main text. The more noticeable checks are discussed
in the following; always focussing on how the alternative estimates support or speak
against our interpretation of the main model estimates.
Our estimates provide training and selection averaged over a longer time period;
from 1970 to roughly the 2000s. Yet, training and selection evolves over time, and
given South Africa’s turbulent recent history probably in a non-continuous fashion.
The number of observations is not sufficient for estimation of reliable time trends
or period effects. Therefore we varied the sample of scientists by the period of
PhD obtained to investigate potential cohort effects within the limits naturally
imposed by our focus on long-term career achievements.
Changing the sample by including all scientists which obtained a PhD either
after 1960 or after 1975 has very little impact on estimation results. One reason
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is of course that the sample changes only slightly, for example the 1975 restriction
excludes about five percent of scientists and ten percent of rating events from
the sample. Further restrictions of the sample, such as PhD obtained after 1980,
however keeps very few rating events with scientists of an experience of 25 years or
more — the period when higher ratings are typically achieved. Using the sample
of scientists with PhD obtained after 1980 we obtain coefficients which remain
close to those of the main results (within one standard deviation). The order
and magnitude of average ability remains the same as in the main estimation.
Estimations for experience, our period-varying intercepts driving training effects,
are less favourable though for foreign universities and improve for South African
universities with respect to the first 20 years of experience. Training estimates
should however not be emphasised too much since there are signs of over-fitting in
particular for foreign universities.
Given that (relative) training quality changes over time, one might wonder
whether Period of PhD is rightly excluded from the rating equation. In order
to test for the relevance of the exclusion of Period of Phd for the results, we
removed this variable from the selection equation. This had a very small effect on
our estimates because identification rests mainly on the ability equation, rather
than the exogenous shifter ‘Period of Phd’ in the selection equation. Without the
ability equation, i.e. estimating a more traditional factor structure model, training
and selection are indeed not separated; all ex-post heterogeneity is attributed to
training and nothing to selection. Thus, the validity of our results regarding the
sorting of ability into university types rests on the assumption that age at master,
distinction at master, and master university influences PhD university selection
and training only through (signals of) ability (except for a general tendency to
stay at a master university for PhD for reasons different from ability).
The assumed separation of master from PhD studies is institutionalised in
South Africa but may not hold always in practice. Yet, this assumption does seem
correct for master students who switched university from master to PhD. To check,
we re-do the analysis on a restricted sample: including only those who hswitched
universities between Master and Doctorate. Thisleaves 482 scientists experiencing
979 rating events (which is relatively few observations given the complexity of our
model). Observations remain the same for those going abroad for a PhD, and we
also estimate ability and training to be the same as in the main estimation for
these students. In South African universities however average ability decreases by
more than one standard error. This drop is consistent with the idea that students
of higher (lower) ability than their peers tend to switch to higher (lower) qual-
ity institutions for their PhD. Training at generic and third tier South African
universities is estimated to be considerably higher (more than one standard devi-
ation), but we would not generalise this result as there are signs of over-fitting of
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period-specific intercepts.
What exactly should be considered a top tier institution is somehow an arbi-
trary decision. We therefore varied the categorisation of top foreign universities
to include only the top 20 Shanghai ranked universities as well as the top 50
Shanghai ranked universities. In either case changing this definition has no effect
on the estimates of South African universities. Considering the top 20 Shang-
hai ranked universities as top foreign universities, we note that average ability
increases slightly for generic foreign universities and by about one standard devia-
tion for top foreign universities. On the other hand, we observe an (insignificant)
increase of training for generic foreign universities and a decrease for top foreign
universities. One explanation might be that competition among high quality in-
stitutions is more on selection than on training. Considering the top 50 Shanghai
ranked universities tends to decrease both selection and training for top foreign
universities. Generic foreign and top foreign universities become more similar in
both aspects. This is reasonable given that nearly all foreign universities in our
data are Shanghai listed and about one half below rank 50.
Which insights remain from the main analysis given the sensitivity checks? Two
statements found broad support throughout: Firstly, more able students tend to
do a PhD at universities of higher reputation. This sorting by ability explains
heterogeneity of career achievements as much or more than differences in PhD
training across universities. That universities of a strong, world-wide reputation
attract the most able students found ample support. Whether generic foreign
universities attract more able students than the best SA universities might be
subject for debate. Secondly, SA universities do not necessarily provide worse
training than foreign universities in Europe or US. In some estimation results,
estimated training effects of foreign universities appear unreasonably low. This
might be caused by our sample which includes only scientists returning from a
foreign PhD, creating a negative bias. Therefore, we need to interpret our results
from the perspective of the developing country: sending students abroad rather
than supporting local PhD programs does not necessarily imply a human capital
gain.
7 Discussion
Scholarship about the role of universities in development has been stalled as schol-
ars struggled to disentangle the functioning of the manifold local and global institu-
tions and influences shaping indigenous universities. In this paper, we deliberately
choose a narrow focus, namely the academic success (as measured in their publica-
tion record) of scholars working in developing countries who have completed their
doctorate at least five year prior. In particular, we consider the human capital that
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is developed in foreign versus local universities in a developing country context.
Using a unique dataset, we have been able to differentiate between the training
and selection effects of receiving a PhD from different institutions. Our economet-
ric model is an extension of a model that has often been used in the evaluation
literature (notably in the schooling effects literature where it was introduced by
Heckman) in order to account for a confounding selection effect: the factor struc-
ture model with a selection and outcome equation, where unobserved individual
characteristics (typically interpreted as individual ability) are factored into a se-
lection and an outcome equation. We expand this model by an additional mea-
surement equation which allows for including proxies of individual ability which
is not possible in the more traditional approach. Table 10 displays our results in
stylized form.





1 Top foreign universities
2 1st tier local universities = All other foreign universities
3 2nd tier local universities
4 3rd tier local universities





1 1st tier local universities = Top foreign universities
2 2nd tier local universities = All other foreign universities
3 3rd tier local universities
4 All other local universities
Table 10: Summary of results: ranking effects of selection and training.
We find that the quality of the PhD granting institution is indeed correlated
with future career success as an academic in South Africa. However, our evidence
suggests that the fairly common view that foreignness equates to quality does not
capture the nuances of university training in a developing country, at least not
in terms of the quantity and quality of research produced by academics. As can
be expected, the perception that foreign universities offer superior training has a
strong effect in terms of the (self)selection of students. Students are particularly
attracted to the universities that would be found at the top of any quality ranking
— Oxford, Harvard, Stanford and so on — but this can perhaps be expected. Stu-
dents from advanced economies also strongly prefer to study at those institutions.
However, even the foreign universities that are not as highly ranked exert a very
strong selection effect. Given that study abroad, even when financial support is
offered, is expensive and disruptive, especially for students with partners and fam-
ilies, this finding is in alignment with the view that indigenous universities offer a
less desirable PhD training.
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However, once selection effects are controlled for, we also find very clear evi-
dence that the leading local universities are “world-class” in the training that they
offer. The evidence of the high quality of scholarly training at a number of the
local universities may appear counter-intuitive at first; the understanding has long
been that universities in developing countries are likely to develop “technicians” of
research, rather than scholars who can meaningfully advance their field. However,
to the extent that a university offers training in the fundamental skills needed to
do meaningful work in the field, it is plausible that scholars from those universi-
ties could produce research that is deemed interesting by their peers globally. In
an increasingly globally connected world the challenges faced by developing coun-
try universities are likely to attract more attention than before. Scholars from
those universities may be able not only to join the informal global networks where
knowledge in their fields is advanced, but also find that their particular contextual
perspective is deemed to be of value to the field.
Indeed, from the perspective of career prospects, a PhD from the top South
African university is more desirable than one from a non-top foreign university,
where “top” foreign refers to the roughly thirty top-ranked international univer-
sities. However, the selection effect is very strong, and the training effect, while
significant, determines less of the future career trajectory than might reasonably
have been expected.
We believe that our work makes important contributions to both theory and
practice. In terms of theory, debates in the past have often built on a vertical
division between developing and developed countries. A strong reason is of course
that universities tend to be associated at the national level, in terms of aspects
like funding, the regulatory context and eventually general reputation. National
boundaries do exist. However, a better understanding may be obtained from doing
a horizontal division, separating first and second-tier universities. Our evidence
suggests that this is a more appropriate division and therefore serves better to
understand the development process.
Practically speaking, “foreign” is not necessarily “better”, which implies that
the PhD programmes eligible for financial assistance for doing the PhD abroad
should be carefully considered. Not all foreign programmes are worthy of support,
at least no more worthy of support than their domestic equivalents. Naturally this
observation applies not only at the ministry or university level, but also at the
student level.
Our evidence also suggests that rating systems do tap into some dimension of
academic quality. The NRF data that we used maps individual rather than in-
stitutional academic performance; indeed, in the uneven post-Apartheid academic
landscape, one of the main purposes of the NRF is to provide a national (rather
than institutional) benchmark of academic quality. However, there was nonethe-
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less correlation between individual and institutional performance. The University
of Cape Town is consistently the top-rated South African university in the various
global rankings, with the University of Witwatersrand and Stellenbosch Univer-
sity appearing in those rankings, but much lower down. The Tier 3 South African
universities all appear in at least one of the three commonly-used ranking systems
(Shanghai, QS and Times Higher Education), but the methodological differences
between the rankings result in substantial variability in the performance of those
universities. The other South African universities do not appear on any rank-
ings. This hierarchy was also evident in our results. As academic administrators
and policymakers battle with the issue of how much credence to give to various
academic rankings, our findings suggest that they do offer useful guidance about
academic quality, especially once a threshold level of quality has been obtained.
The strength of the selection effect in our results permits some optimism re-
garding possibilities for universities in emerging economies to catch up with their
advanced economy competitors. Some local universities are good, and improved
support (e.g. visa regulations to support researcher mobility and increased financ-
ing) might allow the best universities in emerging economies to become recognized
worldwide for the quality of science and scientific training conducted there. The
top global universities will always attract the best students, but as the country
and its education system gains confidence in its (best) universities, the best lo-
cal universities should be able to attract better students than the competent but
non-leading foreign ones.
The study is not without limitations. In terms of methodology, three are worth
mentioning. First, we only observe PhD students that stayed in South Africa or
came back to South Africa. One could imagine that the most promising recipients
of PhDs from South African universities could compete on the international job
market, and leave the country to pursue their careers abroad. While perceptions
about the quality of PhD training in developing countries make such scenarios less
likely, in those cases the training and selection effect of South African universities
would be underestimated. By contrast, if only scientists who did not “make it”
in the US return to South Africa, then the training and selection effects of foreign
universities are underestimated. These dimensions cannot be controlled for with
the current data.
Second, the disentanglement of selection from training effects is only as good
as the instrument and observed ability measures. Our main instruments, “period
of PhD” and the ability measures “Master institution” and “distinction in Master
degree”, are good predictors of university selection but of course less than perfect.
Thus it is possible that treatment effects in particular of foreign top tier universities
are somewhat overestimated. This is an issue shared with any study of our kind
and little can be done to formally address it. Overall, however, our results are
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very robust, and there is no evidence that the highest ranked universities of the
world do not have a positive effect on their bright students.
Thirdly, we have assumed some stability in the system. That is, the effects we
are measuring are assumed not to change over the period of our sample. Partic-
ularly given the history of South Africa, which has included some fairly serious
structural reforms of universities post-Apartheid, this is not strictly true. Some
of the historical evolution will be picked up in the “period of PhD” variable, but
not all. Unfortunately the data are not strong enough to include this possible
instability in the analysis.
In terms of theoretical limitations, although we believe that the paper gains
from our narrower theoretical focus, there are costs to such an approach. The first
relates to the fact that the paper does not actually engage with the role of indige-
nous universities in economic or even technological development. The evidence is
very clear that universities contribute to upgrading not simply through the quality
of academic scholarship, but through linkages with other institutions and in partic-
ular industry (Bernardes and Albuquerque, 2003; Brundenius, Lundvall and Sutz,
2011; Mazzoleni and Nelson, 2007; Mowery and Rosenberg, 1999; Murmann, 2003;
Rosenberg and Nelson, 1994). We provide evidence of one building block in the
process of upgrading — the quality of local science — but recognize the continued
importance of an integrative approach to the role of universities in upgrading.
For example, in addition to the selection effects of foreign versus local univer-
sities, a local selection effect also seems likely. The top local universities are likely
to benefit from a virtuous cycle where the top local students who do not wish (or
are not able) to go abroad will prefer study at the leading local institutions. Poli-
cymakers may respond to local differentiation by nurturing a small group of select
institutions so that they indeed become globally acknowledged for the quality of
scholarship conducted there, or may try to increase the number of high quality
local institutions by spreading financial and other support more widely. The likely
developmental implications of these choices are very different, and may well cen-
tre around the opportunities for linkages offered by different institutions rather
than on pure academic success. Further research is needed to understand how
development is best served.
A related limitation is that this paper considers only the development of human
capital. But social capital is an arguably equally important outcome of academic
training. In addition to training in the social technologies of a field, PhD training
allows scholars to develop relationships that can provide them with collaborators
or at least access to the informal scientific networks in a field. It seems likely
that PhD training abroad provides scholars with a richer social network than local
PhD training, which would increase the value of foreign training. We believe that
further research is needed into how local versus foreign PhD training shapes the
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social capital of researchers.
8 Conclusion
This paper contributes to scholarship about the role of universities in development
by comparing PhD training in the developed world to that in an emerging economy,
South Africa. We focus on a narrow outcome measure, the scientific achievements
of South African academics, which requires of us to sacrifice a general understand-
ing of how universities from developing countries engage with their underdeveloped
context in order to isolate whether the quality of academic scholarship is shaped
by the type of university where the PhD has been obtained. Looking at four tiers
of South African and two tiers of foreign universities, we find that better scholars
indeed emerge from better universities.
This may be because good students select (and are selected by) good univer-
sities, or because of the better training they receive there. Our model allows us
to examine both selection and training effects, and we find that universities from
industrialized countries are preferred over local universities. Indeed, our estimates
show that pure selection effects contribute to career outcomes nearly as much as
training effects. But universities from industrialized countries do not necessarily
provide better training than do local universities. When looking at training rather
than selection, PhDs from top South African universities produce a similar quan-
tity and quality research output to those from leading universities in the developed
world.
This finding allows some confidence about the role of local universities in the
upgrading of developing countries. It suggests that an investment in the local
science system is likely to result not only in the development of fairly basic local
skills, as was previously believed, but can also result in cutting-edge science. While
there is value to foreign training, countries need to consider carefully to which
foreign universities they send PhD students, as not all foreign PhD training is
equally useful. Indeed, from a theoretical perspective, our study suggests that
the discussion about the role of universities in upgrading may be better served by
differentiating universities in terms of the roles they serve in their economy rather
than along the better established “local” and “foreign” dimension. The boundary
experienced for students and scientists between Oxford and the University of Cape
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A Descriptive statistics
The cross-tabulation of rating outcomes by PhD university category is shown in
Table 11. This is the equivalent of Figure 1, but using the fine-grained ratings.
Taken as such, the top foreign universities are clearly outperforming all others
since their PhD graduates achieved relatively many A and B ratings. Similarly, the
typical SA university produced proportionally less Bs and As than other university
categories. With respect to the remainder categories, the pecking order becomes
less clear. Whereas the top-tier SA university and two foreign university have A
PhD graduates, the second-tier SA university gathers the highest percentage of
B PhD graduates. For estimations we combine the rarely achieved ‘A1’ and ‘A2’
ratings into a single rating category ‘A’.
Table 11: Rating outcomes by PhD university category
SA University Foreign University
Other third-tier 2nd-tier first-tier foreign first-tier Total
R.U. 124 (0.17) 65 (0.12) 44 (0.09) 24 (0.08) 22 (0.09) 1 (0.01) 280 (0.12)
C3 192 (0.26) 114 (0.21) 85 (0.18) 38 (0.12) 44 (0.18) 12 (0.1) 485 (0.2)
C2 255 (0.34) 173 (0.32) 152 (0.33) 96 (0.31) 63 (0.25) 37 (0.31) 776 (0.32)
C1 76 (0.1) 75 (0.14) 72 (0.15) 51 (0.16) 30 (0.12) 26 (0.21) 330 (0.14)
B3 31 (0.04) 43 (0.08) 35 (0.08) 33 (0.11) 28 (0.11) 15 (0.12) 185 (0.08)
B2 33 (0.04) 31 (0.06) 44 (0.09) 41 (0.13) 34 (0.14) 10 (0.08) 193 (0.08)
B1 23 (0.03) 28 (0.05) 26 (0.06) 18 (0.06) 19 (0.08) 10 (0.08) 124 (0.05)
A2 14 (0.02) 2 (0) 8 (0.02) 9 (0.03) 10 (0.04) 7 (0.06) 50 (0.02)
A1 2 (0) 2 (0) 0 (0) 2 (0.01) 0 (0) 3 (0.02) 9 (0)
Total 750 (1) 533 (0.98) 466 (1) 312 (1.01) 250 (1.01) 121 (0.99) 2432 (1.01)
Table 12 provides the number of students which obtained their PhD in a given
period for any of the six university categories. The share of foreign PhDs has been
relatively low during the 80s, when the academic boycott was most severe. The
share of foreign PhDs recovered during the 90s for the generic foreign university
category but not for top tier foreign universities. The share of PhD graduates from
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SA universities has been relatively stable over time, except for a steady relative
decay at third tier SA universities.
Table 12: Period of PhD by PhD University Category
PhD SA university PhD foreign university Total
Period of PhD Others 3rd-tier 2nd-tier 1st-tier Others 1st-tier
1970-75 15 (0.26) 8 (0.14) 9 (0.16) 6 (0.1) 15 (0.26) 5 (0.09) 58 (1.01)
1975-79 24 (0.3) 21 (0.26) 15 (0.19) 5 (0.06) 11 (0.14) 4 (0.05) 80 (1)
1980-84 31 (0.33) 27 (0.29) 17 (0.18) 12 (0.13) 3 (0.03) 3 (0.03) 93 (0.99)
1985-89 51 (0.3) 43 (0.25) 41 (0.24) 24 (0.14) 6 (0.04) 6 (0.04) 171 (1.01)
1990-94 79 (0.36) 46 (0.21) 38 (0.18) 33 (0.15) 10 (0.05) 11 (0.05) 217 (1)
1995-99 97 (0.35) 57 (0.2) 55 (0.2) 35 (0.12) 30 (0.11) 7 (0.02) 281 (1)
2000+ 87 (0.3) 58 (0.2) 56 (0.19) 44 (0.15) 35 (0.12) 9 (0.03) 289 (0.99)
Total 384 (0.32) 260 (0.22) 231 (0.19) 159 (0.13) 110 (0.09) 45 (0.04) 1189 (0.99)
B Monte Carlo analysis
In theory the set-up of the econometric model presented in the main text allows
for varying freely the relative influence of ‘innate ability’ and the (fixed-scale)
error term on rating. In practice, for identification on the observed data, we
fix the scale of innate ability. The following Monte Carlo analysis shows that
this approach corresponds potentially to a wrong assumption about the true data
generation process which may result in biased coefficient and treatment effect
estimates. This result prompts us to robustify our main results in the subsequent
section C, ‘Alternative Models’.
Table 13 summarises the settings for data simulation in both studies. The
equations to generate the data correspond exactly to those of the econometric
model used for estimation, except for the additional coefficient τ used to vary
the scale of ability ν in the rating equation. In the first MC study (MC 1), we
generate data with τ = 1. The second MC study (MC 2) generates data with τ = 2.
Estimation results are obtained in both cases on the same restricted econometric
model with τ = 1. Except for the τ coefficient, all parameters are identical for
both MC studies. Generated data is similar in size and complexity to our observed
data.
Our discussion of the Monte Carlo results focusses on the rating equation (Table
14) and ATE (Table 15).
We first turn to the rating equation results in Table 14. In both Monte Carlo
studies, MC 1 and MC 2, true β1 is a university specific intercept in the rating
equation increasing from 1 for university 1 to 5 for university 5. Since β2 = 1 for
all universities, β1 is the sole source of the training effect in the simulated dgp.
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Table 13: Settings for Monte Carlo simulations
Equations
νi = Vi + εi,ν (ability eq.)
D∗i = W i +Ziα+ ζνi + εi,D (selection eq.)
R∗i,t = X i,tβ IDi=p + τνi + εi,t,R (rating eq.)
Coefficients
τ = 1 in MC 1, τ = 2 in MC 2
α =
(
0 1 2 3 4








1 2 3 4 5




0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
)
Indices
S 1000 MC simulation runs
N 1000 individuals
NT 2000 rating observations (2 ratings per individual)
Q 2 factors in ability equation
P 5 universities
L 2 factors in selection equation (indiv.-varying)
K 2 factors in rating equation
Regressors
Vi scalar N(0, 1)
W i Vector with P = 5 iid N(0, 1) distr. entries
Zi Vector with L = 2 iid N(0, 1) distr. entries
X i,t Vector with intercept and N(0, 1) scalar (K=2)
Error terms
εi,ν N(0, 1) in ability equation
εi,D P -vector, iid extr. value distr. entries (multinomial-logit)
εi,R iid extr. value distr. (ordered logit)
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Table 14: Rating coefficients in Monte Carlo studies
MC 1 (τ = 1) MC 2 (τ = 2)
Uni. 1 Uni. 2 Uni. 3 Uni. 4 Uni. 5 Uni. 1 Uni. 2 Uni. 3 Uni. 4 Uni. 5
True
β1 1.000 2.000 3.000 4.000 5.000 1.000 2.000 3.000 4.000 5.000
β2 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
τE[ν] -0.398 -0.634 -0.170 0.279 0.696 -0.799 -1.277 -0.350 0.561 1.396
Mean
β1 0.994 1.991 3.029 3.962 4.996 0.815 1.646 2.926 4.163 5.417
β1 1.008 1.006 1.001 1.003 1.008 0.997 1.005 0.997 1.004 0.997
E[ν] -0.391 -0.620 -0.190 0.338 0.726 -0.556 -0.880 -0.239 0.435 1.020
SD
β1 0.116 0.145 0.177 0.181 0.160 0.148 0.183 0.212 0.212 0.190
β2 0.098 0.117 0.129 0.117 0.092 0.126 0.154 0.167 0.152 0.121
E[ν] 0.785 0.763 0.748 0.744 0.760 1.034 1.015 0.987 0.986 1.014
Bias
β1 0.006 0.009 -0.029 0.038 0.004 0.185 0.354 0.074 -0.163 -0.417
β2 -0.008 -0.006 -0.001 -0.003 -0.008 0.003 -0.005 0.003 -0.004 0.003
E[ν] -0.007 -0.014 0.019 -0.059 -0.030 -0.243 -0.397 -0.111 0.126 0.376
RMSE
β1 0.119 0.145 0.183 0.185 0.162 0.246 0.406 0.245 0.284 0.461
β2 0.099 0.116 0.128 0.121 0.093 0.125 0.149 0.163 0.148 0.122
E[ν] 0.067 0.086 0.112 0.120 0.073 0.272 0.425 0.212 0.209 0.393
The selection effect in the simulation manifests itself in the scaled expected ability,
τE[ν], conditional on the university. The econometric model restricts τ = 1 and,
hence, only allows for unscaled ability, E[ν]. In MC 1 τ = 1, and τE[ν] ranges
between -0.634 for University 2 and 0.696 for University 5.22 Since ν is scaled by
τ = 2 in MC 2, τE[ν] is twice as much.
The estimates averaged over MC simulations (Mean), MCMC standard devi-
ations averaged over MC simulations (SD), the difference between true value and
mean estimates (Bias), and the root mean squared error of estimates to true values
over MC simulations (RMSE) are used to judge the performance of the econometric
model.
In the first Monte Carlo study, MC 1 (left side of Table 14) estimated coef-
ficients β and estimated expected ability ν are close to their true values. Also
the SD of β within single estimations reflects well the variation of the estimates
around the true value (RMSE). SD of E[ν] differs from RMSE of E[ν] because the
former gives the average variation of individual abilities within a single estimation
while the latter gives the variation of average ability across estimations. Overall,
the model performs very well in MC 1.
22True E[ν] is calculated as the average of simulated νi within university categories and across
simulation runs.
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Table 15: ATE in Monte Carlo studies
MC 1 (τ = 1) MC 2 (τ = 2)
Ratings Uni. 1 Uni. 2 Uni. 3 Uni. 4 Uni. 5 Uni. 1 Uni. 2 Uni. 3 Uni. 4 Uni. 5
True
1 0.341 0.207 0.112 0.054 0.024 0.341 0.207 0.112 0.054 0.024
2 0.160 0.134 0.095 0.057 0.030 0.160 0.134 0.095 0.057 0.030
3 0.160 0.160 0.134 0.095 0.057 0.160 0.160 0.134 0.095 0.057
4 0.134 0.160 0.160 0.134 0.095 0.134 0.160 0.160 0.134 0.095
5 0.095 0.134 0.160 0.160 0.134 0.095 0.134 0.160 0.160 0.134
6 0.057 0.095 0.134 0.160 0.160 0.057 0.095 0.134 0.160 0.160
7 0.030 0.057 0.095 0.134 0.160 0.030 0.057 0.095 0.134 0.160
8 0.014 0.030 0.057 0.095 0.134 0.014 0.030 0.057 0.095 0.134
9 0.010 0.024 0.054 0.112 0.206 0.010 0.024 0.054 0.111 0.206
Bias
10 0.001 -0.000 0.002 -0.002 -0.000 -0.061 -0.104 -0.081 -0.055 -0.032
11 0.000 0.000 0.002 -0.001 -0.000 0.041 0.022 0.004 -0.007 -0.010
12 -0.000 0.000 0.002 -0.001 -0.000 0.043 0.041 0.026 0.009 -0.002
13 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.029 0.044 0.041 0.029 0.013
14 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.009 0.032 0.042 0.043 0.032
15 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.007 0.013 0.027 0.041 0.044
16 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.000 -0.014 -0.003 0.007 0.024 0.040
17 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.014 -0.011 -0.009 0.002 0.021
18 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.025 -0.033 -0.058 -0.084 -0.106
RMSE
19 0.018 0.017 0.014 0.008 0.003 0.064 0.106 0.083 0.057 0.033
20 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.007 0.004 0.042 0.024 0.009 0.010 0.011
21 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.006 0.044 0.042 0.027 0.011 0.006
22 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.007 0.030 0.045 0.042 0.030 0.015
23 0.008 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.011 0.033 0.043 0.043 0.033
24 0.006 0.008 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.014 0.029 0.042 0.045
25 0.003 0.006 0.009 0.010 0.011 0.015 0.007 0.011 0.026 0.041
26 0.002 0.004 0.007 0.009 0.011 0.014 0.012 0.012 0.009 0.023
27 0.002 0.004 0.009 0.013 0.014 0.025 0.034 0.060 0.086 0.107
The second Monte Carlo study, MC 2 (right side of Table 14), shows that
restricting the scale τ to one in the estimation when in the true dgp it is not
creates a bias.23 In this example where τ > 1 the role of the treatment effects
parameter β1 is overestimated and average ability E[ν] is less relevant than in the
true dgp. Hence, the bias of the treatment parameter β2 is negative for universities
one to three and positive for universities four and five. The opposite holds for E[ν].
23In MC 2, Mean and SD are normalised by the average β2 across universities, 0.784. Bias
and RMSE are calculated based on these normalised values. The normalisation allows for a
comparison of the estimates to the true values and the relative influence of the intercept, β1,
and average ability E[ν] in the rating equation. The approach follows the same logic as the
normalisation of coefficients to compare results of a logit and a probit model, for example.
45
Compared to MC 1, the larger bias creates a larger RMSE in MC 2.
Table 15 shows that the bias in the coefficient estimates carries over to the ATE
estimates. The true ATE is the same in both simulation studies since the data is
simulated with the same true β coefficients (upper part of Table 15). Probabilities
of obtaining a certain rating conditional on university are correctly estimated in
MC 1 since the bias is small overall. In MC 2 however the shape of the condi-
tional probability mass function tends to be smoother than the true probability
mass function. Despite this bias, the relative tendencies across universities are
still captured, for example low probability of obtaining a high rating conditional
on university 1 and high probability of obtaining a high rating conditional on uni-
versity 5. The relatively low RMSE, mostly below 5%, supports the idea that the
overall pattern estimated is consistent with the true conditional probabilities.
The results of the Monte Carlo analyses prompt us to estimate alternative
models; presented in the next section.
C Alternative models
C.1 Traditional Factor Structure Model
An alternative to the model presented in the main text is the more traditional
Factor Structure Model (FSM) which excludes the ability equation and instead
assumes an unconditional distribution of ability over individuals. We estimate the
model using the same Bayesian approach, simply removing the ability equation.
We find that FSM identifies the same order of universities by their training effect
but fails to separate treatment from selection effects.
Table 16 provides the estimation results. We judge university training effects
on the average training effect, i.e. the average (period-specific) intercept in the
rating equation for each university. The average training effect suggests the same
order between universities as found in the main results, i.e. 1st-tier foreign uni-
versity (4.86) % 1st-tier SA university (4.48) % ‘other’ foreign university (4.35) %
2nd-tier SA univ. (3.87) % 3rd-tier SA univ. (3.55) % ‘other’ SA univ. (3.09).
The difference between FSM and main results is in differentiating selection from
treatment effects. Estimation results of FSM ascribe most ex-post heterogene-
ity to treatment effects, while estimated selection effects contribute very little to










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This result is caused by a relatively weak exogenous shifter in the selection
equation. Our exogenous shifter is ‘period of phd obtained’. Indeed, estimates
of the FSM model without the exogenous shifter ‘period of phd obtained’ in the
selection equation yields very similar results (no table provided). Therefore we
conclude for the FSM estimations that ATE estimates are likely to be biased
upwards while ASE estimates are biased downwards.
C.2 Models with ability scaled in the rating equation
The Monte Carlo analysis yields the result that assuming a scale of one for ability
in the rating equation could potentially introduce a bias in the coefficient esti-
mates and, consequently, ATE and ASE estimates. Unfortunately, estimations on
our data do not converge for freely estimated scaling factors τ . We therefore es-
timate the model again with different scaling factors (see Appendix ‘Monte Carlo
simulation’ for the corresponding equation).
We estimated the model with a scaling of τ = 0.5 which performs worse con-
sidering the log-likelihood but does not change considerably the results. We found
that increasing the scaling factor τ tends to increase the log-likelihood of the esti-
mated model. For example increasing the scaling from τ = 1 to τ = 2 improves the
log-likelihood from -5532.88 to -4969.1 (see Table 17). The reason for this improve-
ment is that unexplained individual-level heterogeneity in research achievements is
actually rather large, and therefore increasing the scale of individual ability, which
is akin to introducing more noise in the model, yields a higher log-likelihood.
Increasing the scaling factor τ also tends to increase the role of the selection
effect compared to the training effect. Consider for example the results for a scaling
of τ = 2 displayed in Table 17. The overall level of (unscaled) average ability and
average training is rather similar to those presented in the main estimation results.
Yet, (scaled) ability is scaled by two in the rating equation and, hence, twice as
influential as before.
The ordering of universities based on the ‘average training’ statistic changes.
In particular ‘1st-tier foreign universities’ are estimated to provide in average a
similar training effect as ‘other foreign universities’ and ‘2nd-tier SA universities’
(both with avg. training of 4.3). Investigating the period varying intercepts of the
rating equation, the ordering of universities appears less consistent. For example
for the first 5 to 9 years after phd ‘other SA universities’ are estimated to provide
a larger training effect than ‘1st-tier foreign universities’, while the opposite is
estimated to hold for the ‘25-29 years after phd’. This result seems unreasonable.
One explanation for this behaviour may be that training varies not only across
universities but also with the students’ ability. Thus ex-post individual-level het-
erogeneity due to training might be loaded on ex-ante heterogeneity. The next































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































C.3 Model with ability dependent treatment effects
The above econometric models build on a questionable assumption. The long-
term effect of an individual PhD university on subsequent research achievements
is assumed to be invariant to the ability of the student. In the alternative model
we allow for a university specific treatment effect that varies with the ability of
the students, i.e. τp(νi).
This way, treatment effects are allowed to vary not only for students with same
‘initial ability’ studying at different universities, but also for students with different
‘initial ability’ studying at the same university. For example a more able student
might benefit more from a demanding phd program than a less able student.
To cap model complexity, we simplify the rating equation by restricting the
coefficient vector to be the same across all universities (βp = β), and by dropping
the additive ‘innate ability’ which is subsumed in the new function τp(νi).
R∗i,t,p = X i,tβ + τp(νi) + εi,t,p,
In the spirit of a non-parametric regression, we do not assume an analytical
function for τ but instead estimate a fixed τ value for each university category
for different levels of ν. The continuous latent variable ν may fall into 1 . . . q . . . Q
levels defined by (Q− 1) hurdles, and we define:
τp(νi) = τp,q if (q − 1) < νi < q,
where for τp,1 the lower limit is −∞ and for τp,Q the upper limit is +∞.
We fix the hurdles ex ante to the estimation. Hurdles need to be chosen such
that each level of ν at each university has sufficient data support. We explored
extensively models with three levels of ν: low ability (−∞ < ν ≤ 0), medium
ability (0 < ν ≤ 2), and high ability (2 < ν ≤ ∞).
Given τp,q, νi, and the hurdles q one can easily calculate the rating proba-
bilities P (Ri = r|Xi, νi). In theory, one could directly estimate the model with
the transformed rating equation through MCMC. In practice however the estima-
tion becomes unstable because variation in abilities cause a rugged optimisation
landscape as individuals cross the hurdles from one MCMC step to the next. We
establish a smoother landscape by integrating out the ability ν in the rating equa-
tion, taking the current state of ability in the MCMC step as expectation and a
variance of one which corresponds to the variance in the original ability equation
(Equation 1). The rating probabilities with ability integrated out then reads:
P (Ri = r|Xi) =
∑
q∈Q
P (νi ∈ q|Vi) P (Ri = r|Xi, νi ∈ q)
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We turn now to the estimation results displayed in Table 18. We first note
that indeed the treatment effect varies with student ability as the treatment factor
τ differs significantly over ability levels within the same university category. The
order of universities by treatment effect remains largely the same as observed in the
prior models. Furthermore, average ability in university categories follows largely

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 19: ATE from alternative model ‘ability dependent treatment effects’
SA university Foreign university
other 3rd-tier at 2nd-tier 1st-tier other 1st-tier
RU 0.128 0.123 0.12 0.082 0.098 0.05
(0.11, 0.145) (0.103, 0.146) (0.092, 0.146) (0.058, 0.113) (0.068, 0.134) (0.027, 0.08)
C3 0.202 0.199 0.199 0.177 0.179 0.16
(0.183, 0.219) (0.182, 0.215) (0.182, 0.217) (0.152, 0.196) (0.162, 0.2) (0.131, 0.187)
C2 0.332 0.332 0.32 0.313 0.294 0.341
(0.306, 0.353) (0.309, 0.352) (0.297, 0.343) (0.284, 0.342) (0.257, 0.336) (0.297, 0.382)
C1 0.14 0.146 0.135 0.157 0.157 0.163
(0.124, 0.157) (0.13, 0.162) (0.118, 0.157) (0.141, 0.173) (0.13, 0.179) (0.136, 0.192)
B3 0.074 0.077 0.076 0.09 0.092 0.094
(0.065, 0.084) (0.067, 0.088) (0.066, 0.088) (0.078, 0.107) (0.072, 0.112) (0.076, 0.112)
B2 0.068 0.069 0.076 0.09 0.091 0.094
(0.058, 0.079) (0.06, 0.08) (0.066, 0.086) (0.076, 0.104) (0.071, 0.108) (0.078, 0.108)
B1 0.038 0.038 0.048 0.06 0.059 0.064
(0.031, 0.047) (0.029, 0.047) (0.039, 0.057) (0.049, 0.072) (0.044, 0.073) (0.044, 0.085)
A 0.017 0.016 0.024 0.031 0.03 0.035
(0.011, 0.022) (0.012, 0.021) (0.017, 0.032) (0.022, 0.042) (0.02, 0.042) (0.023, 0.051)
Considering ATE and ASE estimates, displayed in Tables 19 and 20, we note
that the advantage of 1st-tier SA universities over ‘other’ foreign universities in
terms of training effect is somewhat reduced. ATE is estimated to be on the same
level for 1st-tier SA and ‘other’ foreign universities, while ASE remains larger for
‘other’ foreign universities only in the very high rating categories B1 and A.
In sum, the results of the alternative model with ability dependent treatment
effects are in line with those presented in the main section. Therefore we consider
the main model as a useful simplification. The next section investigates to what
extent insights of the main model pertain under sample and variable variations.
D Variations on the sample and variables
D.1 Scientists with phd obtained after 1960, 1975, or 1980
The main results have been obtained on a sample including scientists which ob-
tained their PhD after 1970. In order to see how results change when the sample
covers differing time periods, we estimated the main model for samples including
all scientists obtaining their PhD after i) 1960, ii) 1975, iii) and 1980. We provide
a short discussion on the results of each but for brevity include a result table only
for the sample restriction ‘phd obtained after 1975’ (Table 21).
Expanding the sample to include all researchers with PhD obtained in or after
1960 includes 1210 researchers with 2537 rating events. Estimation results for in-
dividual equations change only slightly. Remarkable is that 1st-tier SA universities
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Table 20: ASE from alternative model ‘ability dependent treatment effects’
SA university Foreign university
other 3rd-tier at 2nd-tier 1st-tier other 1st-tier
RU 0.131 0.108 0.086 0.08 0.086 0.059
(0.114, 0.151) (0.092, 0.126) (0.071, 0.1) (0.069, 0.092) (0.074, 0.101) (0.044, 0.071)
C3 0.247 0.21 0.173 0.163 0.173 0.126
(0.228, 0.265) (0.192, 0.231) (0.154, 0.192) (0.145, 0.178) (0.152, 0.192) (0.1, 0.147)
C2 0.337 0.335 0.327 0.324 0.327 0.305
(0.32, 0.356) (0.318, 0.353) (0.312, 0.341) (0.305, 0.339) (0.309, 0.343) (0.281, 0.322)
C1 0.122 0.141 0.16 0.164 0.16 0.183
(0.109, 0.135) (0.128, 0.158) (0.145, 0.172) (0.15, 0.179) (0.145, 0.175) (0.165, 0.204)
B3 0.061 0.075 0.09 0.094 0.09 0.111
(0.053, 0.069) (0.062, 0.086) (0.079, 0.102) (0.081, 0.106) (0.077, 0.101) (0.096, 0.129)
B2 0.055 0.069 0.086 0.091 0.086 0.112
(0.048, 0.062) (0.061, 0.08) (0.076, 0.098) (0.081, 0.103) (0.076, 0.097) (0.095, 0.129)
B1 0.032 0.042 0.053 0.056 0.053 0.07
(0.027, 0.037) (0.035, 0.05) (0.045, 0.064) (0.047, 0.065) (0.043, 0.064) (0.057, 0.083)
A 0.015 0.02 0.026 0.027 0.026 0.034
(0.012, 0.018) (0.015, 0.024) (0.02, 0.031) (0.022, 0.033) (0.019, 0.031) (0.027, 0.042)
obtain a higher estimated treatment effect than 1st-tier Foreign universities in this
sample; but only due to a change of about one half of their respective standard
errors.
Reducing the sample to include all researchers with PhD obtained in or after
1975 yields very similar results as those of the main estimation. In particular
the score ranking of universities based on comparison of the intercept as well as
average ability across universities remains the same. This can be expected as the
sample changed only slightly, a drop of about 5% in the number of individuals and








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Estimating the model for an even later period, such as PhD obtained after 1980,
however leaves very few rating observations with researchers more than 25 years of
experience - which are the ones achieving the higher ratings. Therefore we reduce
the model and include one dummy for experience of 25 years or later. Looking at
Table 22 shows that ability is estimated very close to the main results. Although
coefficient changes compared to the main model remain within one standard de-
viation, there is a tendency of a reduced training effect (lower period after phd
coefficients) for foreign universities. Taking the reduced estimates at face value
suggests that the training effect of foreign universities relative to South African
universities has been higher during the 70s than during the 80s and 90s. We hesi-
tate however to attach great importance to that result due to the relatively small
number of observations in some time periods. Indeed the non-monotonic pattern









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































D.2 Scientists switching university from master to PhD
Throughout the analyses we assumed that the decision and training effect of doing
a master at a certain university can be separated from the decision and effect of
following a PhD program subsequently. While it is true that in South Africa the
Master is in general separated from the PhD, rather than integrated as is often the
case in the US, the decision where to do a master might be intermingled with the
PhD decision. For PhD students switching university from master to PhD this is
certainly not an issue. This argument suggests the alternative sample restriction of
including only those PhD students which switched university from master to PhD.
This criterion reduces the number of cases considerably to 482 scientists involved
in 979 rating events.
Table 23 provides estimation results on this reduced sample. First consider
average ability which follows an order that seems natural. It is lowest, -0.74 at
‘other SA universities’ and subsequently increasing up to 1.02 at ‘1st-tier foreign
universities’. Note that this spread of about 1.7 is larger compared to the main
estimation results having a spread of about 1.3. While estimated average ability
increases for both foreign university categories, it decreases for SA universities
in general and in particular for ‘1st-tier SA universities’. The reason is that the
movement from master university to phd university typically is from lower tier
master universities to higher tier PhD universities, and that lower tier SA mas-
ter universities are estimated to issue master students of lower expected average
ability.
The change of average ability caused by restricting the sample to switching
students is actually consistent with the idea that a sorting of students after master
takes place. More able master students of a university tend to switch to institutions
of higher reputation while less able master students might be prompted to do a
PhD at a lower ranked institution. The fact that students in general are likely to
stay at their master universities for PhD, be it due to switching costs, better fit, or
information, seem to help all SA universities to maintain a pool of PhD students
with relatively high ability.
Turning to average training (second row in Table 23) we estimate a relatively
low average training for foreign universities, even lower than the training of ‘3rd-
tier SA’ and ‘2nd-tier SA universities’. This result suggests that the model might
not be able to separate correctly selection from training effects. In fact, foreign
university PhD students appear to be advantaged compared to SA students when
we combine average ability and training. While ability factors into the rating
equation constantly over time, we estimate a training effect which varies over
periods after PhD. Thus, ability in our model adds on the training throughout the
career. Yet, there is the possibility that selection does not take place on realised
scientific ability but on signals of potential ability and that PhD training actually
58
helps to realise that potential. With this interpretation average ability could be
interpreted as a training effect which is constant over time, while the period varying
intercept after PhD rather describes differences in career trajectories.
The issue is probably amplified by the relatively low number of observations
in this sample. The fact that university-period varying intercepts become less















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































D.3 Shanghai ranking of 1st-tier foreign universities
The main results use a categorisation where all universities having a Shanghai
ranking of 30 or lower are considered as ‘1st-tier foreign university’. We varied
the coding in both directions. In one estimation only universities with a Shanghai
ranking of at most 20 are labelled ‘1st-tier foreign university’, in another estimation
all universities among the top 50 in the Shanghai ranking are put in that category.
We discuss first the results of the ‘top 20 foreign universities’, Table 24. Dif-
ferent from what one might expect, average training of the top 20 universities is
estimated to be lower than that of the top 30 universities. The average training of
‘other foreign universities’ increases as much as ‘1st-tier foreign universities’ lose.
The reason however is not in a worse performance of PhDs from 1st-tier foreign
universities. The different ordering is due to a higher estimated selection effect of
1st-tier foreign universities. A relatively high estimate of the selection factor ζ for
1st-tier foreign universities results in a higher expected ability for respective PhDs
and consequently a higher ASE. All other estimates remain unchanged. This result
suggests that differences in graduates between universities of very high reputation







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Results for the alternative coding ‘top 50 foreign universities’ are as expected
and shown in Table 25. Compared to the main estimation results, selection as well
as treatment effects of 1st-tier foreign universities decrease. Average training of
top 50 foreign universities is estimated to be at the same level as ‘other foreign
universities’ (mostly among the top 200, nearly all Shanghai ranked). This training
level is comparable to the top SA universities. Average ability however remains
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